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Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence 
in a Prison Nation 
Angela P. Harris  
ABSTRACT 
We need an analysis that furthers neither the conservative project 
of sequestering millions of men of color in accordance with the 
contemporary dictates of globalized capital and its prison industrial 
complex, nor the equally conservative project of abandoning poor 
women of color to a continuum of violence that extends from the 
sweatshops through the prisons, to shelters, and into bedrooms at 
home. How do we develop analyses and organizing strategies against 
violence against women that acknowledge the race of gender and the 
gender of race?
1
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remarks on the cycle of destructive masculinity at the 2011 Access to Justice Conference at 
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 1. Angela Davis, Keynote Address to Color of Violence Conference, recorded in Charles 
Brown, The Color of Violence Against Women (Oct. 25, 2000), available at http://csf 
.colorado.edu/soc/m-fem/2000/msg01004.htm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September, 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
National Prison Project and the Southern California ACLU released a 
report titled “Cruel and Usual Punishment: How a Savage Gang of 
Deputies Controls LA County Jails.”2 The report describes a jail 
system completely out of control—rife with corruption, malfeasance, 
and above all, unchecked violence. 
The ACLU alleges that much of the violence is perpetrated by 
deputies on inmates. One story is illustrative: 
 The confrontation began because deputies thought Mr. III 
had called them “gay.” When Mr. III repeatedly denied the 
accusation, a deputy yelled to a row of pro per inmates—who 
serve as their own legal representatives—“Y’all pro pers think 
you can get away with anything. We the 3000 boys.”—a 
reference to the gang-like group of deputies in Men’s Central 
Jail. “That shit ends now!” the deputy continued, as Mr. III 
stood one foot away from a cement wall. Suddenly, the deputy 
grabbed Mr. III’s head, slamming his face into the wall. Blood 
poured down, pooling on the ground. Mr. III passed out. 
 When Mr. III regained consciousness, one deputy was 
sitting on his back, punching his face and head. Another was 
kicking Mr. III’s ribs. Although Mr. III was motionless, the 
deputies yelled, “Stop resisting.” Mr. III pleaded with them to 
stop. A deputy shot him with pepper spray. Another sunk three 
Taser probes into his flesh. * * * Mr. III spent two days in the 
hospital and four days in the jail’s medical unit. The deep cut 
in his forehead took 35 stitches to close.
3
 
The report also details incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence, 
alleging that deputies often encourage it. Here is a sample story: 
 
 2. SARAH LIEBOWITZ, PETER ELIASBERG, MARGARET WINTER & ESTHER LIM, CRUEL 
AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: HOW A SAVAGE GANG OF DEPUTIES CONTROLS LA COUNTY JAILS, 
ACLU (Sept. 2011), www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/cruel-and-usual-punishment-how-savage-
gang-deputies-controls -la-county-jails. 
 3. Id. at 15. 
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 After severely beating inmate Juan Pablo Reyes, deputies 
placed him in a cell with inmates who would unleash a 
nightmarish litany of attacks on Reyes, punching, hitting and 
sexually assaulting him off and on for a day. The cell 
contained two gang members who likely viewed Reyes as an 
enemy. Prior to placing Reyes in the cell, deputies had also 
publicly referred to him as “gay,” and had paraded him naked 
in front of these inmates. Thus, Reyes said, the inmates 
proceeded to beat him up for gang-related reasons, because 
they thought he was gay, or because the deputies’ humiliating 
behavior gave them license. The inmates began attacking 
Reyes in the morning. Throughout, deputies ignored Reyes’ 
pleas and his battered appearance. When night fell, the two 
inmates began sexually assaulting Reyes. The third inmate in 
the cell helped mask Reyes’ cries for help by repeatedly 
flushing the toilet. At one point, Reyes’ cellmates stuck his 
head in the toilet and flushed while entering him from behind. 
Reyes lost consciousness several times. Eventually, the two 
inmates fell asleep, but they resumed their attacks at 5 the next 
morning. Deputies continued to ignore Reyes’ cries. The cell 
door opened at 7 a.m., at which point a third gang member 
entered and tried to beat Reyes. Reyes, however, managed to 
escape, yelling for help and running to the laundry room where 
a chaplain found him. At the hospital, Reyes could barely 
walk. He felt extreme pain in his face and ribs. He had a 
broken eye socket from when he was attacked by deputies. His 
buttocks were sore. Rather than receive the necessary surgery 
on his eye, jail officials released Reyes earlier than he expected 
from the jail. He could not afford the surgery on his own.
4
 
In an article published over ten years ago, I argued that much of 
the violence perpetrated by the men who commit crimes as well as 
the men who investigate, arrest, and incarcerate the criminals can be 
described as “gender violence.”5 I began that article with a 
 
 4. Id. at 16. 
 5. Angela P. Harris, Gender Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777 
(2000). 
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description of the sexual assault of Abner Louima by officers of the 
New York City Police Department, one of whom used a broken 
broomstick to sodomize Louima and then bragged about it to his 
fellows.
6
 Louima’s rape, I suggested, was a message in one of the 
many dialects of masculinity, spoken alike by gang members and by 
“boys in blue.”7  
Over a decade later, the dialect of sexualized violence continues to 
flourish. The brutal rape of Juan Pablo Reyes, the violence 
perpetrated in the name of “the 3000 boys,” and the circulation of the 
word “gay”—surely less a sexual identity label than an attribution of 
failed masculinity and consequential vulnerability to attack—all 
indicate loyalty to a particular way of being male. Street gangs and 
“the 3000 boys” may be on opposing teams in the criminal justice 
system of Los Angeles County, but they understand one another 
perfectly.  
Call it “toxic,” or “destructive,” masculinity.8 Manhood as enacted 
in these brutal vignettes relies on two negative identities—not being a 
woman, and not being gay—and violence is the means by which 
these identities are disavowed. As I have argued, men, individually or 
in groups, may use violence or the threat of violence as a sword to 
attack others in the name of their own masculinity, or as a shield to 
defend themselves against an intolerable threat of being “un-
manned.”9 We are familiar with the use of “gender violence” to mean 
male violence against women. Defense attorneys and scholars have 
even coined a term—“homosexual panic”—to describe violent 
attacks by men in a state of emotional overload on men identified as 
 
 6. Id. at 778. 
 7. The reference is to police officers. Boys in Blue, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www. 
urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=boys%20in%20blue (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 8. Therapist Terry Kupers, who works in prison mental health, identifies “toxic 
masculinity” (or “the need to aggressively compete and dominate others”) as rampant among 
incarcerated men, and notes that its prominence is not just due to the presence of men who 
perform conventional masculinity, but to the culture of incarceration itself. Terry A. Kupers, 
Toxic Masculinity as a Barrier to Mental Health Treatment in Prison, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
713, 713 (2005). In his contribution to this Symposium, SpearIt names “destructive 
masculinity” as an ideological system plaguing poor African American and Latino 
communities. SpearIt, Gender Violence in Prison & Hyper-masculinities in the ’Hood: Cycles 
of Destructive Masculinity, 37 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 89 (2011). 
 9. Kupers, supra note 8, at 781. 
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gay or transgender.
10
 Less well recognized is the fact that male-on-
male violence is also gender violence. 
Although destructive masculinity and its prominence in the 
criminal justice system have seemingly not changed much in the past 
decade, at least two new developments have taken place. First, 
scholars and activists committed to ending domestic violence and 
violence against sexual minorities have become increasingly 
disenchanted with the criminal justice system, and increasingly aware 
of its insidious role in the decimation of poor black and brown 
communities. Meanwhile, racial justice scholars have become 
increasingly aware of the toll that destructive masculinity takes on 
those communities. The prospects thus seem better than ever for anti-
violence alliances that, in the words of the epigraph to this Article, 
“acknowledge the race of gender and the gender of race,” while 
similarly acknowledging the importance of sexuality and class. 
Second, in the past decade the “restorative justice” movement has 
gained traction in the United States. Restorative justice offers a 
powerful critique of the existing criminal justice system, one that 
supplements a critical race feminist critique. Its positive program has 
paid less attention to the dynamics of subordination. However, a 
small group of advocates has built on the critical insights of 
restorative justice to develop a vision—dubbed “transformative 
justice”—that holds promise for the struggle to undermine the 
mutually reinforcing systems of toxic masculinity and conventional 
criminal justice. 
In Part I, I revisit the concept of gender violence, which I explored 
in my earlier article, and note its connection to “heteropatriarchy”—a 
system of subordination that burdens not only women and sexual 
minorities but also the straight-identified men that it purports to 
privilege. Understanding this connection, I argue, makes it possible to 
see how gender violence produces not analogous or even 
“intersecting” forms of oppression, but an interconnected web that 
stretches across civil society and the state. This web creates a 
common interest among women, sexual minorities, racialized 
 
 10. See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (2008) 
(examining the use of the “gay panic” defense in the courtroom as an offshoot of the law of 
manslaughter). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 37:13 
 
 
minorities, and straight-identified men in eliminating gender 
violence, as well as potentially making allies of feminist, queer, and 
race scholars and restorative justice advocates. 
In Part II, I describe the central practices and principles of 
restorative justice, and suggest that restorative justice has something 
to offer as a critique of these interlocking vectors of gender violence. 
In return, the insights of anti-subordinationist scholars and activists 
can provide the restorative justice movement with an analysis of 
power and privilege that will alert advocates to the need to challenge 
heteropatriarchy in the state and the family. The resulting vision—
which activists have dubbed “transformative justice”—can help 
academics and advocates rethink our conceptions of what “security” 
means, and move toward practices that aim to heal rather than those 
that perpetuate harm. 
I. MASCULINITIES, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND HETEROPATRIARCHY: 
TOWARD AN INTEGRATED APPROACH  
A. Theorizing Masculinities: Heteropatriarchy Defined 
Understanding gender violence requires us to begin with the 
familiar claim that identity is a social construction. As Simone de 
Beauvoir put it long ago, “One is not born but rather becomes a 
woman.”11 Drawing on the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, 
cultural studies, queer theory, feminist theory, and history, 
masculinities theorists similarly argue that men are not born but 
made.
12
 The genes and genitalia we are born with, they argue, are less 
important in shaping and expressing our gender identity than are 
cultural norms.
13
  
 
 11. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H. M. Parshley trans., 1972) (1949). 
 12. See Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and 
Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 672–74 n.7 (2009) (reviewing the 
masculinities scholarship for a legal audience); see also Nancy E. Dowd, Asking the Man: 
Masculinities Analysis and Feminist Theory, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 415 (2010); Nancy E. 
Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 201, 211–21 
(2008). 
 13. See Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”, supra note 12, at 684 (according to masculinities 
theory, “[i]t is the meaning we choose to make of biological difference that creates our sense of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/3
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This assertion reflects masculinity theory’s intellectual debt to 
second-wave feminism. Second-wave feminists distinguished the 
biological contributions to masculinity and femininity—which are 
popularly considered fixed, unchangeable, and determined at birth—
from the social practices and meanings culturally ascribed to sex, 
naming the first “sex” and the second “gender.”14 Masculinity 
theorists are interested in the gender part. In the social world, 
 
gender”); Dowd, Asking the Man, supra note 12, at 418 (explaining that a core proposition of 
masculinities theory is that “masculinity is a social construction, not a biological given”). 
 14. The sex/gender distinction later proved philosophically troublesome because it rested 
on the assumption that biology and culture could be neatly separated. To the contrary, the 
sex/gender distinction is complicated in at least three ways. First, what we call “gender” goes 
all the way down, so to speak: even our understanding of what our biology is and what it does is 
colored by our expectations, fantasies, and beliefs about there being only two sexes that are 
“opposites,” and the stereotypes attached to those sexes. See generally JUDITH LORBER, 
PARADOXES OF GENDER (1994). Second, most of what we call “biological” attributes are not 
actually fixed at birth. Rather, each living entity is a series of complicated and dynamic 
exchanges between heredity and environment. See generally RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, BIOLOGY 
AS IDEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF DNA (1991). Third, as critical race theorists have recognized, 
labeling a phenomenon or trait as “socially constructed” does not mean that it can be changed at 
will. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 
10 LA RAZA L.J. 57, 99 (1998) (“That race is constructed . . . does not diminish in any way its 
social power or permanence.”). Misunderstanding this last point can mislead advocates into 
searching for “immutable traits,” or encourage people to will themselves into or out of a sexual 
or gender identity. For a recent exploration of the feminist sex/gender distinction in light of 
transgender and intersex activism, see, e.g., Myra J. Hird, Gender’s Nature: Intersexuality, 
Transsexualism and the “Sex”/”Gender” Binary, 1 FEMINIST THEORY 347 (2000). For a 
thoughtful and nuanced discussion of the interplay between structure and agency in homosexual 
identity, see John P. DeCecco & John P. Elia, Introduction: A Critique and Synthesis of 
Biological Essentialism and Social Constructionist Views of Sexuality and Gender, in IF YOU 
SEDUCE A STRAIGHT PERSON, CAN YOU MAKE THEM GAY? ISSUES IN BIOLOGICAL 
ESSENTIALISM VERSUS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM IN GAY AND LESBIAN IDENTITIES (DeCecco 
& Elia eds., 1993). 
 More recent accounts of sex/gender identity emphasize that the process by which people 
come to identify themselves as “male,” “female,” or “other” is similarly the result of complex 
interactions between inherited capacities and the subject’s environment. For example, biologist 
and transgender activist Julia Serano proposes an “intrinsic inclination” model of human gender 
and sexual variation. In her view, subconscious sex, gender expression, and sexual orientation 
are determined independently of one another through a combination of genetic, anatomical, 
hormonal, environmental, and psychological factors. See JULIA SERANO, WHIPPING GIRL: A 
TRANSSEXUAL WOMAN ON SEXISM AND THE SCAPEGOATING OF FEMININITY 99 (2007). These 
“inclinations,” which give rise to a large amount of naturally occurring variation, interact with 
cultural norms of identity and expression to produce an individual’s sense of herself or himself. 
See id. at 223 (“Each of us has a unique experience with gender, one that is influenced by a host 
of extrinsic factors, such as culture, religion, race, economic class, upbringing, and ability, as 
well as intrinsic factors including our anatomy, genetic and hormonal makeup, subconscious 
sex, sexual orientation, and gender expression.”). 
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masculinity is a product both of individual agency and cultural 
structures. “Men,” “women,” and people who identify as both, or 
neither, claim gender identities by the way they dress, walk, and talk. 
At the same time, they have gender identities ascribed to them under 
social rules established by institutional practices and cultural beliefs: 
for example, the rule that people born with penises are always and 
forever “male.”15  
Scholars often describe this interplay of individual agency and 
cultural constraint using the metaphor of “performance.”16 Depending 
on where we find ourselves geographically and socially, a gender 
performance might be considered secure or suspect—unproblematic 
and scarcely notable, or outrageous and upsetting. Moreover, even 
within the same social context there are multiple ways of performing 
manhood, womanhood, or something else, and multiple ways of 
demonstrating to others that you claim (or disclaim) a particular 
gender identity. There is not always social room for changing one’s 
perceived sex, but there is often room for changing the sort of man or 
woman you want to appear to be. From this perspective masculinities 
theorists argue that sex/gender is not a thing you have, but a thing 
you do.  
A second important tenet of masculinity theory is that although 
there are many ways of being a man or a woman, they are not all 
equally socially valued. “Hegemonic” masculinity is what scholars 
call the privileged style of masculinity in a given historical moment: 
the most desirable or most proper way of being a man.
17
 Some men 
 
 15. For a lively discussion of these cultural rules written by a trans woman who objects to 
the cultural insistence that everyone choose between a “male” and “female” identity, see KATE 
BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW (1994). 
 16. The classic analysis of gender identity as performance is JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER 
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990). Legal theorists have taken up 
the basic metaphor of identity as performance with explorations of “working identity,” or how 
individuals strategize in the workplace and elsewhere to manage stigmatized identities. See, 
e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); Devon 
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 
1757, 1793 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
(2002)); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 
(2000); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, 
Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 UC DAVIS L. REV. 853 (2006). 
 17. See Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”, supra note 12, at 683–93 (discussing the literature on 
hegemonic masculinity and the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity). 
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have better access to hegemonic masculinity than others, depending 
on their position in various interconnected hierarchies of privilege 
and oppression. Nevertheless, hegemonic masculinity functions as an 
ideal that regulates all men.
18
 
Hegemonic masculinity in the contemporary United States 
emerges from a set of connected beliefs collectively called 
“heteropatriarchy.”19 Heteropatriarchy includes at least five linked 
assumptions widely taken for granted in Western culture. First is the 
assumption that every person is born, and thereafter remains for life, 
either male or female. Second, one’s sex at birth is assumed to 
determine one’s gender; biology therefore controls one’s social 
behavior. (This was the proposition that second-wave feminist 
theorists rejected when they introduced the distinction between “sex” 
and “gender.”) Third, sex/gender causes males and females to be 
distinctively and dramatically different along dimensions of 
 
 18. “Hegemonic masculinity” thus does not function as a description of how actual men 
think, act, or behave. Rather, it denotes an impossible ideal to which each man must react—by 
aspiring to it, rejecting it, making changes to it, playing with it, or imposing its requirements on 
others. I differ a bit in this regard from Cooper, who, following Michael Kimmel, asserts that 
some men—those who are white, middle-class, and early middle-aged heterosexual—can fully 
achieve hegemonic masculinity. See Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”, supra note 12, at 689. I would 
argue that even men with these privileges are aware that their masculinity can be revoked at any 
time. The movie Deliverance, for example, plays with just this idea.  
 Consider, as well, the “Old Spice Guy.” This character, played by Isaiah Mustafa, is 
advertised to women as “The Man Your Man Could Smell Like,” and the series of commercials 
for the deodorant Old Spice featuring him presents, with a wink, the very essence of hegemonic 
masculinity. See The Man Your Man Could Smell Like, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2010), www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=owGykVbfgUE. The Old Spice Guy—well-built, of apparent African descent, 
but with a suave European-sounding accent—appears at the beginning of one commercial half-
clad outside of a running shower. Then in what appears to be a single take, he is suddenly 
standing on a boat, offering tickets “to that thing you like” that turn into a handful of diamonds, 
and he finally is seen sitting on a white horse in a tropical setting. Id. He begins by addressing 
the viewer directly: “Look at your man. Now back to me. Now back at your man. Now back to 
me. Sadly, he isn’t me. But if he stopped using lady-scented body wash and switched to Old 
Spice, he could smell like me.” Id. The commercial is funny because it pinpoints the nature of 
conventional masculinity: no actual man can achieve it fully, yet every man, taunted by the 
example of someone else who is a better man than he, is challenged to strive (and fail) to 
approximate it. 
 19. For a classic and thorough examination of heteropatriarchy from a legal perspective, 
see Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of 
“Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (1995). My understanding of heteropatriarchy is indebted to Valdes’ account. See also 
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Orientation, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) 
(focusing on how judges conflate these terms in discrimination cases). 
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appearance, character, behavior, interests, and innate abilities. 
Indeed, men and women are popularly said to be so different that 
they are “opposite” sexes.20 Fourth, because “opposites attract” and 
sex differences are complementary, sexual and romantic relationships 
should occur only between men and women, not between people of 
the same assigned sex. Moreover, opposite-sex couples are best 
situated to rear children, because the two sexes have different but 
complementary capacities and skills, and children need to be exposed 
to both. 
These four linked assumptions constitute the “hetero” of 
heteropatriarchy. The fifth assumption provides the “patriarchy”: 
though male and female are opposite sexes, they are not quite equal. 
Masculinity is the privileged sex/gender. In nearly every setting, as 
feminists have pointed out, masculine characteristics and attributes 
are considered superior to feminine ones. Little boys are encouraged 
to distinguish themselves from girls early on, and failure to do so is 
socially punished.
21
 The political and economic order is largely 
controlled and shaped by men in societies around the globe; and 
women are everywhere subjected to rape, sexual harassment, forced 
pregnancy and forced marriage by men.
22
 Worldwide, it is better to 
 
 20. Consider, for example, the title of a best-selling self-help book: Men Are From Mars, 
Women Are From Venus. JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS: THE 
CLASSIC GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE OPPOSITE SEX (1992). 
 21. While young women are permitted to “aspire upwards” to some extent and be 
“tomboys,” men and boys must stick to a rigid script of gender performance or be subject to 
ridicule and rejection by their fellows.
 
See BARBARA M. NEWMAN AND PHILIP R. NEWMAN, 
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH LIFE: A PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH 248 (2009) (“Generally, there is 
more latitude or flexibility around the behaviors that are viewed as acceptable for young girls 
than for young boys. Little boys are more frequently stigmatized for acting in what is 
considered girlish ways, and are more likely to experience peer rejection if their behaviors are 
deemed gender atypical. As a result, a nonconforming gender preference is more likely to be a 
source of distress for boys.”). 
 22. Catharine MacKinnon famously put the argument this way:  
Men’s physiology defines most sports, their needs define auto and health insurance 
coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and 
successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in 
scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, their objectification of life 
defines art, their military service defines citizenship, their presence defines family, 
their inability to get along with each other—their wars and rulerships—defines history, 
their image defines god, and their genitals define sex. 
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give birth to a baby boy than a baby girl; economist Amartya Sen has 
estimated the number of “missing women” who either are not born or 
who die prematurely because of this preference.
23
 Even in the United 
States, which prides itself on its commitment to human rights, 
including women’s rights, women lag far behind men on indicators of 
political and economic power.
24
 
B. Heteropatriarchy and Gender Violence 
Heteropatriarchy shapes the two most important rules of 
hegemonic masculinity: a “real man” is not a woman, and he is not 
gay. As I have argued previously, one of the greatest contributions of 
feminism has been to show how much one’s masculine identity 
depends on disclaiming femininity – “at best by being ‘not a woman,’ 
at worst by excluding, hurting, denigrating, exploiting, or otherwise 
abusing actual women.”25 In the contemporary United States, 
distancing oneself from homosexuality is at least as important. 
Training in not being “gay” (where “gay” is not really about sexual 
desire but rather denotes a failed or “spoiled”26 masculine identity), 
like training in not being female, begins early. For example, 
researchers studying the social lives of students in middle and high 
schools have noted that although the kinds of activities that give a 
boy status and respect vary from school to school, the boys at the 
bottom of any social totem pole—along with any activities or objects 
 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 36 
(1987). 
 23. See Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, THE NEW YORK 
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Dec. 20, 1990, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/dec/20/ 
more-than-100-million-women-are-missing/. 
 24. See Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics and a Progressive Constitution, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2007, 2032 (2001) (noting that the United States has relatively few women 
in its highest governing body, compared to other nations); Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing 
Capital, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 74–75 (2009) (noting the invisibility of women’s labor in 
economic theory). 
 25. Harris, supra note 5, at 785. 
 26. Sociologist Erving Goffman pioneered the discussion of identity work when one’s 
ascribed identity is considered stigmatized or “spoiled.” See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, 
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). 
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associated with them—will reliably be called “gay” and will be 
ridiculed and disparaged accordingly.
27
  
The need to not be gay, moreover, does not disappear after high 
school. As literary theorist Eve Sedgwick argues, masculinity is a 
double bind for men: being a “real man” requires that one secure the 
love and respect of other men, who hold the ultimate power to affirm 
one’s masculinity. Yet the activities best designed to confer true 
masculinity—including participation in sport, the military, and 
mentoring relationships—involve “just the sort of close, emotionally 
intense, and frequently physical and sexually charged relationships 
that subject men to the suspicion that they are homosexual.”28  
The result can be, especially for young men unsure of their 
identities and for older men with few other resources for self-esteem, 
a profound anxiety. Sociologist Michael Kimmel argues that “men’s 
fear of other men[] is the animating condition of the dominant 
definition of masculinity in America . . . the reigning definition of 
masculinity is a defensive effort to prevent being emasculated.”29 
Being judged and found wanting in one’s masculinity is a constant 
possibility for men; they are constantly under the male gaze of 
judgment.  
Sedgwick identifies two results of the masculine double bind: 
“[f]irst, the acute manipulability, through the fear of one’s own 
homosexuality, of acculturated men; and second, a reservoir of 
potential for violence caused by the self-ignorance that this regime 
constitutively enforces.”30 James Gilligan, a psychiatrist on the 
faculty of Harvard Medical School who directed the provision of 
psychiatric services to Massachusetts prisons and prison mental 
hospitals for twenty-five years, links the defense of masculinity with 
violence, through the psychological experience of “shame.” Although 
Gilligan acknowledges that violence is multi-causal, shaped by the 
 
 27. For a nuanced and insightful qualitative research study of the policing of masculinity 
in one high school, see C.J. PASCOE, “DUDE, YOU’RE A FAG!”: MASCULINITY AND SEXUALITY 
IN HIGH SCHOOL (2007). 
 28. Harris, supra note 5, at 787. 
 29. See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the 
Construction of Gender Identity, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
INTEGRATED STUDY 81, 91 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 6th ed. 2004). 
 30. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 186 (1990). 
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interaction of biological, psychological, and social determinants as 
well as individual agency,
31
 at the intra-psychic level Gilligan argues 
that chronic “shame” is an important proximate cause of violence.32 
Shame, respect, and honor are key words in the production of 
gender violence. Gilligan notes that in his years doing 
psychotherapeutic work with violent criminals, “I kept getting the 
same answer when I asked one man after another why he had 
assaulted or even killed someone: ‘because he disrespected me.’”33 
He cites a study by David Luckenbill, who analyzed the history of 
seventy murders that occurred in one California county from 1963–
72.
34
 As Gilligan describes Luckenbill’s findings: 
[I]n all cases the murderer had interpreted his violence as the 
only means by which to save or maintain “face,” and to 
demonstrate that his character was strong rather than weak, in 
a situation that he interpreted as casting doubt on that 
assessment of himself. The opening move that started this 
process was some behavior by the victim that the perpetrator 
interpreted as insulting or disparaging to him and that would 
cause him to “lose face” if he “backed down” rather than 
 
 31. JAMES GILLIGAN, PREVENTING VIOLENCE 67 (2001) (“Violence, like all behavior and 
all disease, is multi-determined, i.e. it is the product of the interaction between a multiplicity of 
biological, psychological and social causes, or variables (for example, male sex hormones, child 
abuse, and relative poverty) each of which can be shown to have the effect of increasing or 
decreasing the frequency and severity of violence, when all the other variables are held 
constant.”). 
 32. As Gilligan explains:  
I will use these two terms—shame and pride—as generic terms to refer to two whole 
families of feelings. Synonyms for pride include self-esteem, self-love, self-respect, 
feelings of self-worth, dignity, and the sense of having maintained one’s honor intact. 
But pride must be in much shorter supply than shame, because there are literally 
dozens of synonyms for shame, including feelings of being slighted, insulted, 
disrespected, dishonored, disgraced, disdained, slandered, treated with contempt, 
ridiculed, teased, taunted, mocked, rejected, defeated, subjected to indignity or 
ignominy; feelings of inferiority, inadequacy, incompetency; feelings of being weak, 
ugly, a failure, “losing face,” being treated as if you were insignificant, unimportant or 
worthless, or any of the numerous other forms of what psychoanalysts call “narcissistic 
injuries.” 
Id. at 29. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 68. 
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responding with violence—even when the victim was only a 
child who refused to stop crying when ordered to.
35
 
Gilligan adds that a failed masculine gender performance—as in, 
for example, the suggestion to a straight-identified man that he is 
really “gay”—threatens shame, confirming Sedgwick’s analysis: 
The image or concept of “homosexuality” functions as a kind 
of universal symbol or equivalent of every form of masculine 
sexual inadequacy . . . it therefore epitomizes every cause of 
shame; and . . . there are few self-images that cause 
patriarchally conditioned men to feel shame more deeply than 
the perception (by themselves or others) that they might be 
“gay.” Many men will resort to almost any degree of violence 
if that is what it takes for them to ward off that perception of 
themselves.
36
 
If Gilligan is correct, then a man hyper-sensitive to shame will 
likely respond to any denigration of his gender performance with 
violence. Moreover, violence is connected with heteropatriarchy in 
another way: violence itself is culturally perceived as masculine.
37
 
Boys don’t cry, but they do fight. Thus, for men acculturated to 
hegemonic masculinity, engaging in violence is a sword as well as a 
shield: it is both a way of defending oneself against shame and a way 
to affirmatively demonstrate one’s manhood. 
C. Gender Violence and the “Cycle of Destructive Masculinity” 
In his article in this Symposium, SpearIt argues that impoverished 
African American and Latino/Latina communities are afflicted by a 
“cycle of destructive masculinity” that perpetuates gender violence 
across generations and across space, circulating norms and practices 
of straight male dominance in and among the street, the home, and 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Kristin L. Anderson, Theorizing Gender in Intimate Partner Violence Research, 52 
SEX ROLES 853, 857 (2005) (“The practice of violence, in Western cultures, is perceived as 
masculine behavior.”). 
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the prison cellblock.
38
 Impoverished straight-identified men of color, 
in his account, are both victims and perpetrators of gender violence. 
A key site of this violence is in the prison system, where destructive 
masculinity is not only reflected but is intensified by state action.  
The racial effects of our contemporary United States policy of 
mass incarceration have been well documented and criticized. Not 
only is the United States the undisputed global leader in mass 
incarceration,
39
 but our criminal justice system also 
disproportionately burdens the brown, black, and poor. Taking the 
city of Chicago as a case study, Michelle Alexander notes that 
“[a]bout 90 percent of those sentenced to prison for a drug offense in 
Illinois are African American,” and that “[t]he total population of 
black males in Chicago with a felony record (including both current 
and ex-felons) is equivalent to 55 percent of the black adult male 
population and an astonishing 80 percent of the adult black male 
workforce in the Chicago area.”40 Nationwide, the Sentencing Project 
reports that more than 60 percent of the people in prison are now 
racial and ethnic minorities, and that for black males in their twenties, 
one in every eight is in prison or jail on any given day.
41
 With the rise 
of what scholars call “crimmigration”—the folding of immigration 
enforcement into the criminal justice system—undocumented 
immigrants living in the United States are increasingly shunted into 
jails and prisons as well, intensifying the burden of the criminal 
justice system on Latino communities.
42
 
 
 38. See generally, SpearIt, supra note 8.  
 39. The United States holds almost 2.3 million people in prison. China, in second place, 
only has 1.6 million of its citizens behind bars, and Russia is a very distant third with only 
806,000 people in prison. International Centre for Prison Studies, Entire World—Prison Totals, 
ICPS, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_ 
poptotal (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
 40. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 184 (2010). 
 41. Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING REPORT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
template/page.cfm?id=122 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
 42. On the meaning of “crimmigration,” see Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: 
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 376 (2006) (“Immigration law 
today is clothed with so many attributes of criminal law that the line between them has grown 
indistinct. Scholars have labeled this the “criminalization of immigration law.”). On the impact 
of crimmigration on Latinos, see, e.g., Julia Preston, Latinos Said to Bear Weight of 
Deportation Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2011, at A16 (describing a report issued by the law 
schools at University of California–Berkeley and Cardozo finding that Secure Communities, a 
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The combined effects of mass incarceration on black education, 
housing, employment, and political voice have led Alexander to 
describe the current United States criminal justice system as “The 
New Jim Crow.”43 Alexander joins a chorus of other critics who have 
condemned the political and social effects of the existing criminal 
justice system on African American communities in particular.
44
 
These critics observe that not only are policing, jail, prison, and 
probation powerful sites for ideological “race-making”—perpetuating 
anti-black and anti-Latino stereotypes—but also that contemporary 
criminal justice policy is economically, politically, and socially 
devastating for poor black and brown communities.  
The criminal justice system is not only a race-making institution, 
however. It is also a gender-making institution, and destructive 
masculinity is a key product.
45
 The incorporation of gender violence 
into the criminal justice system begins with the police. In the United 
States, policing, like the military, is deeply rooted in ideologies of 
physical bravery and brotherhood that stem from hegemonic 
 
deportation program backed by the Obama Administration, “has led disproportionately to the 
removal of Latino immigrants and to arrests by immigration authorities of hundreds of United 
States citizens”). 
 43. See ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, supra note 40, at 186–95 (discussing the 
parallels between the effects of Jim Crow formal racial segregation and the current criminal 
justice system). 
 44. For examples of the social science literature criticizing the social, political, and 
community effects of mass incarceration, see, e.g., IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL 
EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION (Patillo et al. eds., 2004); JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER 
UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006). 
For condemnation of mass incarceration’s effects on African Americans in the legal literature, 
see, e.g., Paul Butler, One Hundred Years of Race and Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1043 (2010); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racialism: Racial Stratification and Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023 (2010). Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, 
Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on 
Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381 (2002); Dorothy Roberts, Constructing a Criminal 
Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
261 (2007); Dorothy Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004); Justin Stec, The Deconcentration of 
Poverty as an Example of Derrick Bell’s Interest Convergence Dilemma: White Neutrality 
Interests, Prisons, and Changing Inner Cities, 2 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 30 (2007); Floyd D. 
Weatherspoon, The Mass Incarceration of African American Males: A Return to 
Institutionalized Slavery, Oppression, and Disenfranchisement of Constitutional Rights, 13 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 599 (2007). 
 45. See SpearIt, supra note 8, at 126–31. 
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masculinity.
46
 Male police officers still dramatically outnumber 
female officers in most departments around the country;
47
 police 
training emphasizes the importance of physical strength and the 
ability to intimidate;
48
 and the number of openly gay male police 
officers is extremely low.
49
 Policing borrowed from the military a 
hierarchical institutional structure and a culture of solidarity that has 
traditionally emphasized notions of homosocial “brotherhood,” 
making tolerance of homosexuality unthinkable;
50
 hence the report 
that no police officer in the United States admitted in public to being 
gay or lesbian until 1981.
51
 Moreover, surveys suggest that the 
resistance of police officers to accepting gay men and lesbians in 
their ranks continues.
52
  
 
 46. See Harris, Gender Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, supra note 5, at 793; DAVID 
A. SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 150 (2008) (“There is good reason to think that 
the suppression of homosexuality has played a central role in cementing police solidarity, in 
part by rendering professional male-male partnerships sexually unthreatening, and in part by 
helping to shape a whole, hyper-masculinized professional ethos.”). 
 47. David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New 
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIMINAL L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1219 (2006) 
(“[T]he proportion of women officers tops out at twenty-five percent, and there are indications 
that this ceiling may remain in place for the foreseeable future.”). 
 48. Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”, supra note 12, at 693–96 (discussing the importance of 
“command presence” and the intense interest among some officers in bodybuilding). 
 49. Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department, supra note 47. 
 50. The centrality of homosexuality to policing is certainly a staple of popular culture, if 
not actual police culture. One study found only one gay police officer portrayed in the first three 
decades of “core cop film police officer portrayals.” Franklin T. Wilson et al., The Absence of 
Gay and Lesbian Police Officer Depictions in the First Three Decades of the Core Cop Film 
Genre: Moving Towards a Cultivation Theory Perspective, 16 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR 
CULTURE 27, 33 (2009). This is not surprising given that an important theme in American cop 
films is the intense homosocial bond between two dissimilar officers. The “buddy film” 
portrays true love between men by disavowing any hint of homosexuality.  
 51. DAVID E. BARLOW & MELISSA HICKMAN BARLOW, POLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL 
SOCIETY (2000). 
 52. See Phillip M. Lyons, Jr. et al., Texas Police Chiefs’ Attitudes Toward Gay and 
Lesbian Police Officers, 11(1) POLICE Q. 102 (2008) (finding that almost half the Texas police 
chiefs surveyed said that they would have difficulty working with a gay man, while only 27 
percent said that they would have no difficulty); Mary Bernstein & Constance Kostelac, 
Lavender and Blue: Attitudes About Homosexuality and Behavior Toward Lesbians and Gay 
Men Among Police Officers, 18(3) J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 302 (2002) (finding reluctance on 
the part of gay and lesbian police officers to come out for fear of job discrimination); but see 
Eric Coleman & Sutham Cheurprakobkit, Police Hiring and Retention of Sexual Minorities in 
Georgia and Texas After Lawrence v. Texas, 37(3) J. CRIM. JUST. 256 (2009) (finding that 
Lawrence has encouraged police departments to retain their gay and lesbian officers, though not 
to recruit any more). 
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Frank Rudy Cooper has shown how policing, both in its structure 
and in the way it is practiced in many American cities, incorporates 
hegemonic masculinity in often destructive ways. Cooper points out 
that officers’ concern with establishing dominance in any situation 
and with punishing disrespect sets them up for “masculinity 
contests.”53 When male police officers confront male civilians in such 
contests, the result may be injury or death.
54
 
Incarceration, however, most dramatically incorporates gender 
violence and the most destructive forms of hegemonic masculinity. 
Giovanna Shay notes that “the rule of law,” as we are accustomed to 
imagining it, constrains practices in the American criminal justice 
system only weakly because of the courts’ extreme deference to 
prison administrators, the lack of transparency of prison affairs, and 
the public’s apparent desire that prisoners be out of sight and out of 
mind.
55
 In this environment, Kim Shayo Buchanan argues, prison 
administrators create their own rules of governance, incorporating 
social norms of subordination that divide prisoners to make them 
more manageable.
56
 Prison officials’ use of racial designations to 
“divide and conquer” groups of inmates is well known.57 In addition, 
 
 53. Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”, supra note 12, at 674. 
 54. Cooper explains the situation this way: 
The civilian faces a masculinity challenge because the officer’s restriction of his 
freedom is changing him from a presumptively innocent citizen to a suspect. The 
civilian may be spread-eagled against a wall as peers pass by gawking. Police officers 
also face a masculinity challenge, however, since, as a matter of both their roles as law 
enforcers and their senses of self, they cannot stand any challenge to their authority. 
That is why officers punish disrespect. Certainly, there is some legitimacy to the idea 
that officer safety requires that they be able to control the movements of dangerous 
suspects with whom they are actively engaged. However, the more important reason 
why officers seek complete control of citizens is that their sense of masculine esteem 
is tied to being shown respect by citizens. When officers feel disrespected, they face a 
masculinity challenge. Since manhood is demonstrated for other men’s approval and 
the overwhelming majority of both officers and suspects are male, officers may often 
view the police-civilian encounter as an opportunity to stage a masculinity contest. 
Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”, supra note 12, at 699. 
 55. Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329 (2009). 
 56. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Our Prisons, Ourselves: Race, Gender and the Rule of Law, 29 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 11 (2010) (“[M]any institutions adopt a practice of institutional 
governance by which guards and administrators often respond to sexual abuse by enforcing the 
rules of masculinity.”). 
 57. Prisoners turn to gangs to protect themselves, and these gangs are generally organized 
along racial lines. Corrections personnel are not only mindful of the racialized gang order, but 
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Buchanan argues, prison officials enforce “the rules of masculinity in 
their crudest and most violent forms.”58 Sexual violence is one of 
those forms. 
As Buchanan observes, the idea that incarcerated men are 
vulnerable to sexual violence perpetrated by other men is a well-
known subject of hilarity in the general culture.
59
 The humor 
indicates anxiety, but also truth: same-sex rape and other forms of 
sexual violence do happen to incarcerated men. In accordance with 
heteropatriarchal norms, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and effeminate 
men experience dramatically elevated rates of sexual abuse.
60
 But 
straight-identified men are also vulnerable to violence. For example: 
Guards and administrators often require the prisoner to “be a 
man” by fighting off his assailants. If the prisoner is unable to 
protect himself, he is often told that he does not deserve their 
protection because he is “gay.” This practice requires prisoners 
to prove their manhood by fighting, on pain of rape.
61
 
Buchanan notes that black men are widely presumed to be the 
perpetrators of rape in prison and white men the victims.
62
 In fact, 
research suggests that most victims are men of color.
63
 And as 
 
incorporate it into their own governance practices. See Philip Goodman, “It’s Just Black, White, 
or Hispanic”: An Observational Study of Racializing Moves in California’s Segregated Prison 
Reception Centers, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 735 (2008) (suggesting that intake personnel at prison 
reception centers encourage incoming prisoners to identify themselves racially, partly in 
response to the racialization of gangs inside and outside prison). 
 58. Buchanan, supra note 56, at 8. 
 59. Id. at 2. For an argument that it is time that our society took the rape of men seriously 
rather than treating it as a joke, see I. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1259 
(2011). 
 60. NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE 
COMMISSION ELIMINATION REPORT (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
226680.pdf; VALERIE JENNESS ET AL., VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 26 (2007), available at http://uci 
corrections.seweb.uci.edu/pdf/Executive_Summary_of_Val_s_PREA_report.pdf (finding that 
67 percent of gay, bisexual, and transgender men reported having been sexually assaulted in 
prison, as compared to 2 percent of straight men).  
 61. JENNESS ET AL., supra note 60, at 23. 
 62. Buchanan, supra note 56, at 64 (“Prison rape is not disproportionately black-on-white. 
Nonetheless, many people involved in prisons and their administration—prisoners, guards and 
administrators, Congress, academics and even some human rights advocates—continue to 
believe that it is.”). 
 63. Id. at 61. 
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SpearIt points out, the traumatized victims and the perpetrators of 
gender violence are likely to return to the same communities where 
they grew up, now at greater risk of traumatizing others.
64
 Violence 
against women is one predictable consequence of a destructive 
masculinity that degrades femininity and whose coin is force. 
Homophobic violence is another. Finally, we may guess that child 
abuse, including child sexual abuse, is facilitated by the return of 
sexually abused prisoners to their neighborhoods. SpearIt concludes 
that through the cycle of destructive masculinity, prison does not 
simply punish the perpetrators of gender violence; it also facilitates 
and escalates more gender violence, involving straight-identified men 
both as victims and as perpetrators.
65
 Therefore, though some gender 
violence in prison can be traced back to civil society, much is 
iatrogenic—caused by the very mechanism that purports to stop the 
violence.  
D. Toward an Integrated Approach to Gender Violence 
Queer theorists have long identified gender violence as a strategy 
to maintain heteropatriarchy. Darren Hutchinson makes a 
representative argument: “[h]omophobic violence . . . executes (or 
‘enforces’) the political, social and ideological institution of 
heterosexism; it punishes non-heterosexual practice, and it aims to 
prevent future challenges to heteronormativity by employing the 
threat of violence to attach fear and stigma to nonheterosexual 
intimacy and desire.”66 Feminist scholars similarly see violence 
against women as a way of keeping all women (and men) compliant 
with compulsory heterosexuality.
67
 As Elizabeth Schneider has 
written:  
 
 64. See SpearIt, supra note 8, at 131–34.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Darren Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical 
Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 19 (1999). 
 67. But see Gwen Hunnicutt, Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: 
Resurrecting “Patriarchy” as a Theoretical Tool, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 553, 559–60 
(2009), available at http://vaw.sagepub.com/content/15/5/553 (pointing out that feminist 
theories of violence against women have become more nuanced over time, as theorists absorbed 
the point that violence against women can signal weakness rather than strength). 
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[H]eterosexual intimate violence is part of a larger system of 
coercive control and subordination; this system is based on 
structural gender inequality and has political roots. . . . In the 
context of intimate violence, the impulse behind feminist legal 
arguments [is] to redefine the relationship between the 
personal and the political, to definitively link violence and 
gender.
68
 
These analyses are not wrong, but they have nevertheless laid the 
groundwork for a dependence on the criminal justice state that has 
intensified rather than ameliorated gender violence. For instance, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, feminist advocates challenging rape and 
domestic violence began to rely heavily on a criminalization strategy, 
fighting for policies such as mandatory arrests for domestic violence 
police calls, calling for more rape prosecutions, and developing new 
kinds of “social frameworks evidence” such as battered women’s 
syndrome.
69
 In the 1980s, anti-violence advocates representing both 
women and sexual minorities began to fight for the adoption of, and 
inclusion in, “hate” or “bias” crime statutes as an equality issue.70 
 
 68. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 5–6 (2000). 
 69. See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence 
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001) (describing feminist interventions in 
domestic violence law); KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE 2–5 (2008) (describing the 
work of feminist advocates from the 1970s on and how grassroots organizations began to be 
absorbed into government programs); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 
WASH. L. REV. 581, 587–95 (2009) (summarizing feminist interventions in rape law). 
 70. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines a hate crime as a “criminal offense 
committed against a person, property, or society which is motivated, in whole or in part, by the 
offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national 
origin.” FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1998: UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS 57 (1999). Some hate crime statutes impose an enhanced penalty when bias is 
found to be the motivation for any crime; other statutes explicitly delineate and punish crimes 
of “hate.” The Federal Enhancement Statute defines “hate crime” as “a crime in which the 
defendant intentionally selects a victim, or in the case of a property crime, the property that is 
the object of the crime, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person.” 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994). As 
one commentator explains, the particular identity categories protected by bias crime 
enhancement statutes differ among states and localities, but all follow a basic pattern. See 
Jordan Blair Woods, Taking the “Hate” Out of Hate Crimes: Applying Unfair Advantage 
Theory to Justify the Enhanced Punishment of Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
489 (2008). For historical accounts of the evolution of hate crimes statutes and the social 
context of the sudden explosion of these statutes in the 1980s, see, e.g., Valerie Jenness & 
Ryken Grattet, MAKING HATE A CRIME: FROM SOCIAL MOVEMENT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
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The logic behind this reliance on the criminal justice system is clear: 
because violence against women and sexual minorities intensifies and 
legitimizes discrimination against these groups, criminal punishment 
for the perpetrators of such violence furthers the cause of equal 
citizenship. Like expressive violence itself, criminal punishment is 
widely understood to “send a message”71—the message that women 
and sexual minorities matter.  
 
17–41 (2001); Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a 
Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 564–620 (1998). 
 In 2009, President Barack Obama signed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate 
Crimes Prevention Act, extending the protections of federal hate crimes law to crimes based on 
sexual orientation, gender identity, race, religion, gender, national origin, and disability. 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, § 4707, 123 Stat. 2190, 2838 (2009). Previously, federal law had only encompassed bias 
crimes motivated by race, color, religion, and national origin. The change was hailed by many 
advocates as a victory for sexual minorities. For instance, upon the signing of the bill, National 
Gay and Lesbian Task Force Executive Director Rea Carey issued this statement:  
Laws embody the values of our nation, and through the enactment of this hate crimes 
law, our country has—once and for all—sent a clear and unequivocal message that it 
rejects and condemns all forms of hate violence, including crimes motivated by hatred 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people.  
Press Release, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Task Force: Signing of hate crimes 
measure is historic (Oct. 28, 2009), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/press/releases/ 
pr_102809. 
 Not all formulations of bias crimes require proof of consciously held and articulated hatred 
for the victim’s identity group in order to sustain a conviction, but the sense that such a mental 
state exemplifies “bias” has colored much of the discussion about these laws. For instance, this 
model was one of the obstacles to passing the civil rights provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) which defined crimes of violence against women as sex 
discrimination. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322 
(1994). Opponents objected that the targets of violence against women are often not “fungible” 
in the same way as the targets of other bias crimes, and, by extension, that perpetrators of 
violence against women did not hold animus toward “women” in general, but toward a specific 
individual, meaning that these crimes were not based on bias at all. See Rachel F. Moran, Law 
and Emotion, Love and Hate, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 747, 765–66 (2001). As Sally 
Goldfarb points out, however, before being struck down by the Supreme Court, VAWA’s 
interpretation accepted a wide range of evidence as proof of animus against women, even 
accepting the analogy between racial and sexual bias crimes. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying 
the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women: Some Reflections on Theory and 
Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 251, 262–63 (2003). 
 71. Of course, what it means to “send a message” is a complicated philosophical and 
sociological issue, which falls outside the scope of this Article. For reflections on the expressive 
theory of criminal punishment, see William DeFord, The Dilemma of Expressive Punishment, 
76 U. COLO. L. REV. 843 (2005); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); see also Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong With Shaming 
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In the last few years, however, feminist academics and advocates 
have become increasingly uneasy about their reliance on the criminal 
justice state. Leigh Goodmark argues that mandatory arrest and no-
drop prosecution policies reflect “maternalism,” an advocacy 
approach that “assumes that women who have been battered are 
incapable of considering the full range of possibilities and deprives 
them of the ability to make choices for themselves, based on their 
own goals, values, beliefs, and understanding of their situations.”72 
Aya Gruber argues that rape reform has failed to substantially benefit 
victims, while bolstering a program of state power and control that is 
antithetical to feminist principles.
73
 Janet Halley and others similarly 
argue that feminist alliances with the criminal justice state mark the 
development of a new feminist strategy—“governance feminism”—
that may result in policies and rules that are inconsistent with 
feminist principles.
74
 
Queer theorists, taking a similar critical turn, have criticized hate 
crimes legislation as a path toward equal citizenship. Jane Spade and 
Craig Willse argue that “the rhetoric of hate crimes activism isolates 
specific instances of violence against queer and transgender people, 
categorizing these as acts of individual prejudice, and obscures an 
understanding of the systemic, institutional nature of gender and 
sexuality subordination.”75 Leslie Moran argues that “the gay and 
lesbian demand for law reform feeds a law and order politics of 
 
Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075 (2006) (recanting his arguments for shaming sanctions but 
elaborating his theory of expressive punishment).  
 72. Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory 
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2009). 
 73. See Gruber, supra note 69, at 652. 
 74. Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and Chantal Thomas, From the 
International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex 
Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
335, 420 (“[W]e find that American and European feminists, making seemingly symbolic 
victories in the U.S. Congress, the United Nations, the ICTY, or the Rome Statute negotiations, 
can put in motion chains of legal causation that—by the time they reach Tel Aviv, Kolkata, or 
Chicago—can be exceedingly acute, and not always feminist in any intelligible sense.”). 
 75. Jane Spade and Craig Willse, Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism: A 
Radical Critique, 21 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 38, 39 (2000).  
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retribution and revenge that may be implicated in the promotion, 
institutionalization, and legitimization of hate.”76 
Taking seriously the gender violence inflicted on men in the 
criminal justice system adds another dimension to these criticisms. 
Tracing gender violence as it moves through different social sites—
the street, the home, the prison—makes it clear that heteropatriarchy 
kills: not only women and sexual minorities, but men, including those 
who identify as “straight.” SpearIt’s notion of the cycle of destructive 
masculinity makes clear as well that gender violence is a race and 
poverty issue.  
Accordingly, anti-violence theorizing and advocacy must take an 
integrated approach, understanding the interplay of race, sexuality, 
class, and gender and taking account of the places where, and the 
means by which, gender violence is perpetuated. “Violence against 
women” is not distinct from “violence against sexual minorities.” Nor 
are analyses of the United States as a “prison nation” complete 
without a reckoning of the toll that gender violence takes on the 
vulnerable of all sexualities, colors, and genders. 
The approach that I am advocating here has been given many 
names—“intersectionality,” “co-synthesis,” and “multidimension-
ality,” among others.77 At its heart is a theoretical shift of focus from 
group identities to interlocking practices and beliefs that makes 
 
 76. Leslie J. Moran, The Emotional Dimensions of Lesbian and Gay Demands for Hate 
Crime Reform, 49 MCGILL L.J. 925, 925 (2004). 
 77. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (introducing the 
concept of intersectionality); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intersectionality in Theory and 
Practice, in Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location 124 (Emily 
Grabham et al. eds., 2009) (“[Intersectionality theory's] core insight—that analysis of 
discrimination based on a single identity trait does not adequately account for intersecting 
aspects of identity, such as race or sex—has been widely embraced.” (citation omitted)); Darren 
Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the 
Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 309 (2001) 
(examining “the relationships among racism, heterosexism, patriarchy, and class oppression 
utilizing a model I refer to as ‘multidimensionality”’); Athena D. Mutua, Theorizing 
Progressive Black Masculinities, in Progressive Black Masculinities 3, 22–24 (Athena D. 
Mutua ed., 2006) (defining multidimensionality theory); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay 
Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1362–68 (2000) (defining multidimensionality theory in contrast to 
intersectionality theory); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (1997). 
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possible a broader definition of the problem: in this case, the shift 
from “violence against women” to “gender violence.” Sometimes the 
technique that Mari Matsuda named “looking to the bottom” can 
make such a reframing possible.
78
 Thus, even within the “violence 
against women” frame, scholars have long recognized that women of 
color tend to be more poorly served by existing institutions and 
practices, even feminist ones, than white women.
79
 But, as we have 
seen, the move from violence against women to gender violence 
makes possible an even more comprehensive mapping of the ways in 
which heteropatriarchy kills. What might initially look like a 
dilemma—a choice between women’s safety or racial justice—turns 
out to be an instance of interest convergence.
80
 
This turn to a gender violence analysis—instead of the “violence 
against x” analysis—should not be confused with the project of 
simply making existing programs “diverse” or “inclusive.” Advocates 
for women of color experiencing intimate violence, for example, 
complain about the effort to “include” them in campaigns framed by 
and for white women.
81
 Instead, the task is to develop anti-violence 
proposals and projects that are responsive to the experiences of 
differently situated groups from the very beginning. Efforts to pay 
attention to the race of gender, the gender of race, and the sexuality 
and class of each may demand new kinds of conversations with 
different people at the table. The process may not be an easy one, but 
the potential is great. 
  
 
 78. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 359–60 (1987) (describing the utility of looking to the 
experiences of the least advantaged). 
 79. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 77, at 1246–49 (describing the problems that women 
of color, including immigrant women, have in accessing domestic violence services). 
 80. The late Derrick Bell suggested that progressive social change tends to occur only 
when it is in the interest of the majority. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORMS 49–58 (2004). 
 81. See INCITE! WOMEN OF COLOR AGAINST VIOLENCE, COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE 
INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 3 (2006) (“All too often, inclusivity has come to mean that the sexual or 
domestic violence prevention model, developed largely with the interests of white middle-class 
women in mind, should simply add a multicultural component.”). 
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II. FROM RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE:  
THE CASE OF GENDER VIOLENCE 
[L]onger prison sentences offer no solution to the problem of rape 
and indeed may simply exacerbate the problem at an individual level 
by placing the rapist in a masculine culture which reinforces the 
misogynist fantasies that were part of his behaviour patterns outside 
the walls.
82
  
 
If reliance on the criminal justice system to address violence 
against women and sexual minorities has reached the end of its 
usefulness, to where should advocates turn next? Prison abolitionists 
propose to dismantle the criminal justice system altogether.
83
 Arguing 
that not only has mass incarceration taken a terrible toll on black and 
brown communities, but that prisons do not effectively prevent crime, 
rehabilitate offenders, provide specific and general deterrence, or 
hold the guilty accountable, abolitionists conclude that imprisoning 
people has become an end in itself in our society. From the 
abolitionist perspective, the criminal justice state is a “prison-
industrial complex,” perpetuated by those who benefit financially 
and/or politically from the business of incarceration.
84
 As a critique 
of existing practices and institutions, these arguments have 
considerable force; mainstream policymakers and academics, as well, 
 
 82. Joe Sim, Book Review, 18 INT’L J. OF THE SOC. OF L. 97 (1990) (reviewing H. 
BIANCHI & R. VAN SWAANINGEN, ABOLITIONISM: TOWARD A NON-REPRESSIVE APPROACH TO 
CRIME (1986)). 
 83. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS AND EDUARDO MENDIETA, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY: 
BEYOND EMPIRE, PRISON, AND TORTURE (2005); Angela Y. Davis, Racialized Punishment and 
Prison Abolition, in TOMMY LEE LOTT AND JOHN P. PITTMAN, A COMPANION TO AFRICAN 
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 360 (2003); Dorothy Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System 
Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261 (2007).  
 The prison abolition movement has a history in Europe as well as in the United States. See, 
e.g., Stan Cohen, Introduction, 10 CRIME, LAW, & SOCIAL CHANGE 3 (1986) (describing 
abolitionism in Western Europe as a product of “the countercultural politics of the Nineteen 
Sixties”). 
 84. Julia Sudbury describes the prison-industrial complex as “an intricate web of relations 
between state penal institutions, politicians and profit-driven corporations.” Julia Sudbury, 
Celling Black Bodies: Black Women in the Global Prison Industrial Complex, 70 FEMINIST 
REVIEW 57, 57 (2002); see also GLOBAL LOCKDOWN: RACE, GENDER, AND THE PRISON 
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (Julia Sudbury ed., 2005); EVE GOLDBERG AND LINDA EVANS, THE 
PRISON-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998). 
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exhibit frustration and even despair at the state of American 
punishment.
85
 Yet a world without prisons and punishment is 
unthinkable to many people. Moreover, even those committed to the 
ultimate goal of abolition may support projects that can help ease the 
suffering of those caught in the criminal justice system here and now. 
In this Part, I argue that the restorative justice movement—
augmented with a theory of power and privilege—is such a project. 
In Part A of this section I describe the restorative justice 
movement and argue that its critique of conventional criminal justice 
should be appealing to anti-gender violence advocates. In Part B, I 
acknowledge the force of feminist and race-aware critiques of the 
positive restorative justice project, and endorse instead what 
advocates have called “transformative justice.”86 A transformative 
 
 85. See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JFA INST., UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND HOW TO 
REDUCE AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION (2007); JAMES AUSTIN & TONY FABELO, JFA INST., 
THE DIMINISHING RETURNS OF INCREASED INCARCERATION (2004); LYNN S. BRANHAM, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, THE USE OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A LOOK AT THE PRESENT 
AND THE FUTURE (1992); WILLIAM M. DIMASCIO, SEEKING JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
IN AMERICA (1995); JENNI GAINSBOROUGH & MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, 
DIMINISHING RETURNS: CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE 1990S (2000); RYAN S. KING ET 
AL., SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP (2005); 
PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS (2009); 
DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS 
FOR REDUCING CRIME (2007).  
 86. It is important to acknowledge that this analysis is specific to the situation of gender 
violence in African American and Latina/o communities in the United States and should not be 
generalized to all women of color experiencing gender violence. For example, indigenous 
women in the United States and other white settler societies experience extreme levels of 
gender violence at the same time as their communities are under racist assault by the state. See 
generally ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 
(2005). Indigenous women are not united, however, in supporting restorative justice practices as 
a response to gender violence. See Kathleen Daly & Julie Stubbs, FEMINIST ENGAGEMENT 
WITH RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, 10 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 9, 20–22 (2006) (describing 
differences of opinion among indigenous feminists on the value of restorative justice processes 
for intimate partner violence); Rashmi Goel, Aboriginal Women and Political Pursuit in 
Canadian Sentencing Circles: At Cross Roads or Cross Purposes?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 60, 74 (James Ptacek ed., 2010) (finding that, for Aboriginal 
people, “the diverse goals at issue in sentencing circles operate at cross-purposes in domestic 
violence cases”); Heather Nancarrow, Restorative Justice for Domestic and Family Violence: 
Hopes and Fears of Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Australian Women, in RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 123, 143 (James Ptacek ed., 2010) (concluding that 
“[c]urrent models of [restorative justice] do not meet the criteria necessary to fulfill the hopes of 
Indigenous women in addressing the underlying factors associated with domestic and family 
violence.”); Julie Stubbs, Restorative Justice, Gendered Violence, and Indigenous Women, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 103, 115 (James Ptacek ed., 2010) 
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justice approach acknowledges the reality that given the 
embeddedness of gender violence in both civil society and the state, 
true security lies not in “restoration,” but in transformation. 
A. What Is Restorative Justice? 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow notes that the restorative justice 
movement began in the 1970s as a response to the perception 
increasingly held by “social workers, progressive criminal treatment 
professionals (including police officers and prison reformers), some 
lawyers and judges, psychologists, and community and peace 
activists” that the existing criminal justice system was broken—that it 
neither effectively deterred crime nor effectively rehabilitated 
offenders.
87
 The founders of the restorative justice movement—some 
working within the criminal justice system and some working outside 
it—rejected the premise that imposing long periods of incarceration 
under harsh conditions is an effective response to crime.
88
 They 
 
(concluding that among indigenous people, “some openness to [restorative justice] principles 
exists, but . . . a prevailing skepticism remains about what that might mean in practice”); but see 
Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999) (suggesting that Navajo peacemaking processes may be beneficial 
for some battered women). The problem is exacerbated in many indigenous communities by the 
absence of any effective criminal justice enforcement. See Kevin K. Washburn, American 
Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2006) (describing the failure of law 
enforcement in Indian country); Rebecca A. Hart, Comment, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding 
Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CAL. L. REV. 
185 (2008). For indigenous communities, then, a transformative justice analysis brings with it 
questions of national sovereignty that are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 87. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 163 (2007), available at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10 
.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.2.081805.110005. 
 88. For instance, Howard Zehr, one of the founders of restorative justice, writes: 
Will prison teach [the offender] nonviolent patterns of behavior? Hardly. It is more 
likely to make him even more violent. Will it protect society from him? For a while, 
perhaps, but eventually he will come out, and he may be worse for the wear. And 
while there, he may become a danger to fellow inmates. 
Will it deter? Whether his imprisonment will discourage others from committing 
similar crimes is debatable, but it is unlikely to deter him. Indeed, as I have already 
suggested, he may be more, not less, likely to commit crimes because of the lack of 
coping skills and the patterns of behavior he will learn in prison. Moreover, the threat 
of prison will no longer hold such terror for him since he will know he can survive 
there. Indeed, after twenty years it will be home and he will feel insecure outside. 
HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 39 (1990). 
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sought to make offenders more accountable to their victims, to 
respond more directly to the psychological and emotional needs of 
crime victims, and to promote offender rehabilitation.
89
 Their 
innovation was to sidestep the criminal justice system’s emphasis on 
blame and punishment. Instead, they began to focus on the human 
connections that were damaged, broken, or absent when crimes were 
committed.  
As Menkel-Meadow notes, “[r]estorative justice was practiced 
first . . . and theorized later, most eloquently by John Braithwaite.”90 
Braithwaite’s influential first book on restorative justice, Crime, 
Shame, and Reintegration,
91
 suggested that the best way to reinforce 
social norms is not state imposition of violence on offenders—which 
is fundamentally immoral because it interferes with individual 
freedom—but rather social shaming, which permits the offender to 
choose whether or not to accept the judgment of his or her peers.
92
 
Braithwaite suggested that those who would punish should instead 
turn to “reintegrative shaming”: offenders should be encouraged to 
feel shame about their crimes, but after appropriate rituals of guilt, 
responsibility, and penance, they should be welcomed back into 
 
 89. As Zehr puts it: 
Genuine accountability . . . includes an opportunity to understand the human 
consequences of one’s acts, to face up to what one has done and to whom one has done 
it. But real accountability involves more. Accountability also involves taking 
responsibility for the results of one’s behavior. Offenders must be allowed and 
encouraged to help decide what will happen to make things right, then to take steps to 
repair the damage. 
Id. at 42. 
 90. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 87, at 163. 
 91. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989). 
 92. As Braithwaite puts it: 
 Shaming is conceived as a tool to allure and inveigle the citizen to attend to the 
moral claims of the criminal law, to coax and caress compliance, to reason and 
remonstrate with him over the harmfulness of his conduct. The citizen is ultimately 
free to reject these attempts to persuade through social disapproval. . . . A culture 
impregnated with high moral expectations of its citizens, publicly expressed, will 
deliver superior crime control compared with a culture which sees control as 
achievable by inflicting pain on its bad apples.  
Id. at 9–10. 
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society.
93
 In subsequent books and articles, Braithwaite has become 
an increasingly enthusiastic proponent of restorative justice, arguing 
that it is a useful component of theories of responsive regulation, 
theories of civic republicanism, and theories of transitional justice.
94
  
In Restorative Justice and Civil Society, Braithwaite and Heather 
Strang define restorative justice along two dimensions: a process 
dimension and a values dimension.
95
 In its process dimension, 
restorative justice includes a number of specific practices that 
advocates use to supplement—and sometimes replace—the standard 
jail to courtroom to prison process.
96
 For example, in victim-offender 
mediation, offenders meet victims face to face, in the presence of 
trained mediators, and the victim is encouraged to tell his or her 
story; in response, the offender is encouraged to acknowledge the 
harm that he or she caused.
97
 Victim-offender mediation may end in a 
restitution agreement, an apology, neither, or both.
98
  
 
 93. Braithwaite argues: 
The theory of reintegrative shaming . . . implies that punishment need be no more 
severe than is required to communicate the degree of community disapproval 
appropriate to the offense. Punishment should be visible, newsworthy, so that 
consciences can be moulded by the unambiguous communication of the abhorrence 
that society extends toward criminal acts.  
Id. at 178–79. 
 94. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
(2002); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1993); RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Heather Strang & John 
Braithwaite eds., 2001). 
 95. John Braithwaite & Heather Strang, Introduction: Restorative Justice and Civil 
Society, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 1–2 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite 
eds., 2001). 
 96. See Tony F. Marshall, Restorative Justice: An Overview, in A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
READER: TEXTS, SOURCES, CONTEXT 1, 2–8 (Gerry Johnstone ed., 2003) (describing various 
approaches to restorative justice: as “process,” as “set of distinctive values,” as “application of 
spiritual teaching to criminal justice,” as “theory of social justice,” and as alternative 
“lifestyle”). 
 97. Mark S. Umbreit & Jean Greenwood, Guidelines for Victim-Sensitive Victim-Offender 
Mediation: Restorative Justice Through Dialogue, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, Office for Victims of Crime (NCJ 176346). 
 98. Mark Umbreit, one of the experts on victim-offender mediation, focuses on producing 
restitution agreements. See Umbreit & Greenwood, supra note 97, at 7. Other programs based 
on restorative justice principles work to obtain apologies from offenders. See Martin V. Day & 
Michael Ross, The Value of Remorse: How Drivers’ Responses to Police Predict Fines for 
Speeding, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 222 (2011). 
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Family group conferencing is a process in which the offender and 
victim are each accompanied by friends, family, co-workers, or 
others who will offer their support.
99
 As in victim-offender 
mediation, trained facilitators prepare both sides separately before the 
conference, and facilitate the conference itself.
100
 Finally, “circles” of 
various kinds extend the family group conferencing idea to include 
community members who may not be directly related to the offender 
or victim, but who nevertheless have been affected by the crime.
101
 In 
circles, whether they are limited to family and friends or not, the 
emphasis is similarly on direct communication, truth-telling, and 
accountability: establishing a consensus about the harms done in the 
past, facilitating an emotional interchange between perpetrator and 
victim, and forging an agreement about what will be done in the 
future to address past harms and avoid future ones.
102
 
One hallmark of restorative justice processes, as opposed to the 
traditional criminal process, is its responsiveness to victims’ needs.103 
As the victims’ rights movement has emphasized, the victims of 
crime are rendered marginal or irrelevant to the traditional criminal 
justice process.
104
 Many never receive the much-vaunted emotional 
 
 99. See Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice: An Empirically Grounded Movement 
Facing Many Opportunities and Pitfalls, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 511, 529 (2007).  
 100. Id. at 529. 
 101. Id. at 530. 
 102. Id. (noting that for all these practices, the “focus of the encounter nearly always 
involves naming what happened, identifying its impact, and coming to some common 
understanding, often including reaching agreement as to how any resultant harm would be 
repaired”). 
 103. Note, for example, the order in which these restorative justice advocates list the 
stakeholders: “[f[rom a restorative perspective, the primary stakeholders are understood to be 
individual victims and their families, victimized communities, and offenders and their 
families.” Mark S. Umbreit, Betty Vos, Robert B. Coates & Elizabeth Lightfoot, Restorative 
Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 
MARQ. L. REV. 251, 256 (2005). 
 104. See Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4 UTAH L. REV. 861, 865 (2007) (the victims’ rights 
movement emerged because “[v]ictims advocates argued that the criminal justice system had 
become preoccupied with defendants’ rights to the exclusion of considering the legitimate 
interests of crime victims”); see also Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal 
Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229 (2005) (reviewing controversy among lawyers and scholars about 
legitimacy of victims’ rights initiatives). As Cassell notes, since the beginning of the victims’ 
rights movement a number of legislative developments have brought victims into the process: 
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“closure” that a conviction, a plea, or an execution is said to 
produce,
105
 and are left frustrated, angry, or full of unanswered 
questions.  
In contrast, crime victims who agree to participate in a restorative 
justice process often leave feeling satisfied.
106
 Restorative justice 
processes address the question, “Why did this happen?”—a question 
that is often central for crime victims. Many victims report that just 
being able to confront the perpetrator and get a response to the “why” 
question greatly eases their feelings of anxiety and anger and helps 
them move on with their lives.
107
 Even when there is no satisfactory 
answer, victims may experience relief from the ability to safely 
confront the person who harmed them and to tell the story of their 
victimization.
108
  
In a few, perhaps rare, cases, the victim experiences something 
even more powerful: forgiveness. Restorative justice advocates 
emphasize that facilitators should not pressure victims to forgive their 
offenders.
109
 Where it does occur, however, crime victims leave the 
 
In 1982, Congress passed the first federal victims’ rights legislation, the Victim and 
Witness Protection Act, which gave victims the right to make an impact statement at 
sentencing and provided expanded restitution. Since then, Congress has passed several 
acts that further protected victims’ rights, including the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 
the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
and the Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997. Other federal statutes have been 
passed to deal with specialized victim situations, such as child victims and witnesses.  
Cassell, supra, at 866. 
 105. For an exploration of the meaning of “closure” and its prevalence in death penalty 
discourse, see Jody Lyneé Madeira, “Why Rebottle the Genie?”: Capitalizing on Closure in 
Death Penalty Proceedings, 85 IND. L.J. 1477 (2010).  
 106. See Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice, supra note 99, at 533–38 (discussing victim 
satisfaction results in numerous studies). 
 107. See Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and 
Restorative Justice, 1 UTAH L. REV. 15, 22 (2003) (“The evidence suggests that victims see 
emotional reconciliation to be far more important than material or financial reparation.”); John 
Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & 
JUST. 1, 24 (1999) (noting victim interest in “why” question). 
 108. See Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice, supra note 99, at 531 (“[V]ictims frequently 
report that while restitution was the primary motivator for them to participate in VOM, what 
they appreciated most about the program was the opportunity to talk with the offender.”). 
 109. See Umbreit & Greenwood, Guidelines for Victim-Sensitive Victim-Offender 
Mediation, supra note 97, at 14 (“Forgiveness may . . . be expressed during the mediation 
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restorative justice process with a sense that something powerful and 
transcendent in their lives has occurred.
110
 
The restorative process also differs from the conventional criminal 
process in its inclusion of persons other than the offender, the victim, 
and representatives of the state. Chief among these, of course, are the 
third-party facilitators. “Circle keepers” and other restorative justice 
facilitators, like mediators, use skills that lawyers, judges, and 
probation officers are seldom taught, such as how to follow the 
nuances of interpersonal interaction and how to manage both one’s 
own and others’ emotions in a dialogic setting.111 In addition to 
facilitators, restorative justice processes often include members of the 
support systems of both offenders and victims, and sometimes 
unrelated members of the community who have been touched in 
some way by the crime.
112
 This aspect of the restorative justice 
process lends itself to institutions outside the criminal justice system 
altogether, such as schools. In the elementary or secondary school 
context, for instance, “circles” may replace the traditional 
disciplinary system; students, teachers, and administrators may meet 
regularly both to build and maintain community and to address and 
resolve problems before they escalate into a situation requiring 
punishment.
113
 
 
session, but the mediator’s use of the word ‘forgiveness’ may be destructive to the victim. 
Victims may, for example, feel guilty if they fail to feel forgiving.”). 
 110. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 107, at 23 (“It may be that ‘an experience of 
forgiveness’ is what assists victims most of all in recovering from their victimization.”). 
 111. See MARK S. UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION: AN 
ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 3 (2001) (observing that “most conflicts 
develop within a larger emotional and relational context characterized by powerful feelings of 
disrespect, betrayal, and abuse”); see also BRINGING PEACE INTO THE ROOM: HOW THE 
PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
(Daniel Bowling & David A. Hoffman eds., 2003). The thirteen chapters in Bowling and 
Hoffman’s book explore topics such as the need for mediators to be “centered” and “authentic,” 
the need for them to possess “emotional intelligence,” and the need to develop a kind of 
intuition for doing the right thing. Id. 
 112. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice, supra note 99, at 529–30. 
 113. See David R. Karp & Beau Breslin, Restorative Justice in School Communities, 33 
YOUTH & SOC’Y 249 (2001); Cara Suvall, Restorative Justice in Schools: Learning from Jena 
High School, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547 (2009). In the city of Oakland, California, the 
organization RJOY (Restorative Justice for Oakland Youth) attempts to disrupt the school-to-
prison pipeline “by promoting institutional shifts toward restorative approaches that actively 
engage families, communities, and systems to repair harm and prevent re-offending.” About Us, 
Mission, RJOY http://www.rjoyoakland.org/about.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
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Finally, restorative justice advocates argue that the adversarial 
system distances offenders from the victim, from the state, and from 
their own offenses.
114
 The vast majority of criminal offenses are 
settled through plea bargains rather than through trial, and in these 
cases the offender likely has no contact with the victim at all. 
Moreover, the offender’s encounters with representatives of the state 
are strategic in nature and generally mediated through a 
representative of some kind, whether a private attorney, a public 
defender, or appointed counsel. The offender need never be 
confronted with the harm that he or she has caused the victim. If the 
case ends in conviction, incarceration and/or supervision is similarly 
impersonal. The experience of punishment, as some scholars lament, 
may be painful and destructive, but it generally has almost nothing to 
do with the experience of having offended.
115
 For the person 
incarcerated, doing time may be easy, hard, or in between, but for 
reasons that are almost entirely unrelated to the original crime. 
Traditional criminal justice thus “punishes,” but does not promote 
accountability.  
In contrast, restorative justice seeks to engage offenders 
personally and emotionally with the people they have harmed, or 
with some surrogate for them. Offenders in a restorative process are 
pushed to reflect on the harm that they have caused, to acknowledge 
the experiences of their victims, and are encouraged to try to make it 
right, if possible. 
Braithwaite and Strang argue that restorative justice differs from 
traditional justice not only from a process perspective, but also in 
terms of principles and values.
116
 The restorative justice 
 
 114. See GERRY JOHNSTONE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEAS, VALUES, DEBATES 89 (2002) 
(discussing factors that encourage offenders to distance themselves from responsibility for their 
offense); Barbara Hudson, Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Sexual and Racial Violence, 
25 J.L. & SOC’Y 237, 249 (1998) (“In the stigmatizing processes of retributive justice, the 
offender is given more incentives to contest the label than to repent the behaviour; the ‘sin’ 
which people try to avoid is as likely to be that of being found out as that of behaving badly.”). 
 115. Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of 
Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149 (1990). 
 116. John Braithwaite, Principles of Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 1, 7–13 (Andrew von Hirsch 
et al. eds., 2003) (identifying list of restorative justice values ordered into three categories: 
“values that must be honored and enforced as constraints,” including “non-domination,” 
“respectful listening,” and “equal concern for all stakeholders”; values that should be actively 
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understanding of crime as harm to human relationships
117
 suggests 
that the language of “crime” itself is suspect; the state and the law 
should not have a monopoly on defining injury.
118
 
Several principles are embedded in this point. First, a focus on 
human relationships explains the inclusion of friends, family, and 
community members in the process. It also makes sense of restorative 
justice’s focus on eliciting emotion-laden exchanges between 
offenders and victims. Even where the offender and victim are total 
strangers to one another, the fact of harm has created a relationship, 
though a purely negative one. Criminal victimization is commonly 
experienced by the victim as disrespect, a social relation that 
demands to be made right by a showing of respect.
119
  
Second, and more broadly, the interpersonal significance of harm 
leads in at least two directions: inward toward psychology and 
outward toward democracy. At the level of social psychology, 
 
encouraged by participants in any restorative process, such as “[p]revention of further injustice” 
and “restoration of dignity, compassion, and social support”; and values that should not be 
explicitly encouraged but may arise spontaneously from a successful restorative justice process, 
such as forgiveness, apology, and mercy). 
 117. HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 181 
(1990) (“[C]rime represents a violation of human relationships.”). 
 118. Zehr makes this point: 
Some would have us avoid the term [crime] altogether. Crime is a result of a legal 
system which makes arbitrary distinctions between various harms and conflicts. It is an 
artificial construct which throws into one basket a variety of unrelated behaviors and 
experiences. It separates them from other harms and violations and thereby obscures 
the real meaning of the experience. 
Id. at 183. 
 119. In Zehr’s words: 
[C]rime represents a violation of human relationships. Crime affects our sense of trust, 
resulting in feelings of suspicion, of estrangement, sometimes of racism. Frequently it 
creates walls between friends, loved ones, relatives, and neighbors. Crime affects our 
relationships with those around us. 
 Crime also represents a ruptured relationship between the victim and offender. Even 
if they had no previous relationship, the crime creates a relationship. And that 
relationship is usually hostile. Left unresolved, that hostile relationship in turn affects 
the well-being of victim and offender. . . . 
 Crime then is at its core a violation of a person by another person, a person who 
himself or herself may be wounded. It is a violation of the just relationship that should 
exist between individuals. 
Id. at 181–82. 
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restorative justice pays attention to the conventions of human 
interaction and seeks to meet the emotional needs of participants. At 
the level of individual psychology, restorative justice, by treating 
offenders as human beings rather than as “scum” or “garbage,” opens 
up the possibility of compassionate treatment in a way that 
conventional criminal justice actively discourages.
120
 Restorative 
processes assume a fundamental dignity on the part of all participants 
that fosters a sense of basic social equality.
121
 In the conventional 
criminal justice process, by contrast, dehumanization of the offender 
by the victim(s) and by state actors is all too common. 
Restorative justice processes also promote a robust understanding 
of democracy. As Braithwaite has argued, civil society is prior to the 
state in the restorative justice conception of harm; the task of the state 
when a crime has been committed is not to avenge itself in the name 
of an abstract “People,” but to ensure that the bonds of civil society 
are strengthened rather than weakened by its response.
122
 Crime hurts 
not only individual victims but also represents a tear in the social 
fabric. From this perspective, members of civil society, in the form of 
affected members of “the community,” ought to participate directly in 
the process, rather than by being represented solely by the criminal 
justice state or the victim. Restorative justice proponents speak of 
“healing,” “accountability,” and “making things right” rather than of 
punishment.
123
 Their vision is of a healthy and vibrant civil society 
that works alongside, or even instead of, the state to prevent crime 
and then to address it after the fact. Proponents hope that the 
 
 120. Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 1, 11–18 (1997) (exploring racist stereotypes that encourage citizens to dismiss criminals 
as human “garbage”); ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES, supra note 117, at 73–74 (noting that the 
existing criminal justice process encourages key decisionmakers to deny personal responsibility 
for outcomes, discourages them “from acknowledging what they have in common with 
offenders as people,” and distances all participants from pain they are imposing). 
 121. As Gerry Johnstone puts it, “[R]estorative justice proponents espouse the principle 
that all participants in the process—including offenders—‘should be treated in a humane, 
egalitarian way that values their worth as human beings and respects their right to justice and 
dignity.’” JOHNSTONE, supra note 114, at 11. 
 122. See Braithwaite & Strang, supra note 95, at 10 (describing “virtuous circle” in which 
restorative justice, state authority, and civil society mutually reinforce one another). 
 123. Howard Zehr, for instance, argues that restorative justice advocates should seek 
healing for victims, for the relationship between the victim and the offender, for the offender, 
and for the community. Zehr, supra note 117, at 186–88. 
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participants in a restorative justice process, particularly the victim 
and members of the community, will come away feeling 
“empowered”: unafraid, in control of their lives, and better able to 
affect the relationships and institutions in which they participate. A 
third implication of replacing “crime” with “harm” raises both 
dangers and opportunities from the perspective of structurally 
disadvantaged social groups. The primary danger is that restorative 
justice processes, especially if driven by an existing criminal justice 
state, may contribute to what is known as “net-widening.”124 If no 
legally-recognized crime is necessary in order to initiate the process, 
then restorative justice can serve the purpose of putting even more 
poor and minority people under the supervision of the state. More and 
more of the usual suspects will find themselves called to account for 
increasingly trivial harms.
125
 The opportunity is that replacing 
“crime” with “harm” makes it possible for a circle or other restorative 
process to focus on what actually took place, rather than on what 
could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The restorative justice 
approach also makes possible a complex analysis of harm that does 
not label the relevant parties as either “offender” or “victim,” but 
allows for the possibility that some people might be both. Most 
importantly, replacing “crime” with “harm” has the potential to make 
visible harms committed by the state itself. We will come back to this 
point in the section that follows. 
As might be guessed, restorative justice advocates and their 
projects fall along a spectrum from reformist to revolutionary in 
relation to the existing criminal justice system. Where they have been 
implemented in the United States, restorative justice processes are 
typically voluntary and ancillary to the existing system, taking the 
form of diversionary programs. In their most radical moments, 
 
 124. DANIEL W. VAN NESS AND KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE 166 (2d 
ed. 2002) (explaining “net-widening” as the process by which “community-government 
collaboration result[s] in expanded state controls”). 
 125. See Sharon Levrant et al., Reconsidering Restorative Justice: The Corruption of 
Benevolence Revisited?, in A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE READER: TEXTS, SOURCES, CONTEXT 417, 
418 (Gerry Johnstone ed., 2003) (discussing “net widening” as a possible unintended 
consequence of restorative justice initiatives); see also John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: 
Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME AND JUSTICE 1, 89–91 (1999) 
(discussing the possibility that restorative justice practice “can widen nets of social control”). 
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however, restorative justice advocates look forward to the abolition 
of the criminal justice system as we know it. Menkel-Meadow 
observes:  
At its most aspirational or utopian, restorative justice has been 
seen as a potentially transformative social practice that could, 
under the right conditions, obviate the need for harsh criminal 
punishment and incarceration. In this conception, restorative 
justice was linked as a social movement to community 
organizing, criminal justice and prison reform, the civil 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement, and the peace 
movement in that it sought alternative processes for different 
and more humane and tailored outcomes.
126
  
There are a number of lively theoretical and empirical debates in 
and around the field of restorative justice. On the theoretical level, for 
example, there is the issue of whether restorative justice can be 
distinguished from certain forms of retributivism.
127
 At the empirical 
level, the burning question is whether restorative justice actually 
“works.” Does it prevent future crime, and if so, how? Does it help 
victims, and how and when should victim satisfaction be measured? 
Does it shame offenders into feeling remorse and experiencing 
 
 126. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 87 (citation omitted).  
 127. As Kathleen Daly has pointed out, most theories of restoration assume, without 
spelling it out, the value of a retributive moment. Without the attribution of responsibility to the 
offender and the moral censure of the offender for causing harm, the notion of “restoration” 
itself loses its bite. See Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice: The Real Story, in A RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE READER: TEXTS, SOURCES, CONTEXT 363, 364 (Gerry Johnstone ed., 2003); Kathleen 
Daly, Revisiting the Relationship Between Retributive and Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE 33, 34 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2000); see 
also R.A. Duff, Restorative Punishment and Punitive Restoration, in A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
READER: TEXTS, SOURCES, CONTEXT 382, 382 (Gerry Johnstone ed., 2003) (arguing that 
“restoration is not only compatible with retribution and punishment, but requires it”); Conrad 
G. Brunk, Restorative Justice and the Philosophical Theories of Criminal Punishment, in THE 
SPIRITUAL ROOTS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 31 (Michael L. Hadley ed., 2001). See also VAN 
NESS & STRONG, supra note 124, at 43 (“Restorative justice includes principles of 
accountability and acknowledges that accountability may be painful”); RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? (Andrew von Hirsch et 
al. eds., 2003). The relationship between restorative justice and retributionism should therefore 
probably be seen as overlapping rather than antithetical. See Daly, Restorative Justice: The Real 
Story, supra, at 371. It is also the case, of course, that the existing criminal justice system is not 
the pure expression of any single theory; it is a pragmatic institution in which incarceration is 
supposed to simultaneously implement very different purposes of punishment. 
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rehabilitation, or only facilitate facile and meaningless “touchy feely” 
exchanges between offenders and victims? Are apologies or material 
restitution more likely to make victims feel whole and prevent future 
offending? And, most fundamentally, what does it mean for a 
restorative process to “work”—is the goal to make the existing 
criminal justice system more legitimate and palatable, or to 
undermine and ultimately end it?
128
 I will not pursue these debates in 
this Article, as they have been amply addressed elsewhere.
129
 Instead, 
I want to examine the theory of restorative justice from a critical race 
feminist perspective.  
B. From Restorative Justice to Transformative Justice  
There is one obvious pragmatic reason why impoverished black 
and brown communities scourged by both crime and law enforcement 
should be receptive to restorative justice practices: they provide an 
alternative to the unrelenting focus on mass incarceration that has 
 
 128. See VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 124, at 155–83, 185–203 (1997). Andrew 
Ashworth, Some Doubts About Restorative Justice, 4 CRIM. L.F. 277 (1993) (identifying 
number of conceptual and practical doubts); Kathleen Daly, Mind the Gap: Restorative Justice 
in Theory and Practice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 219, 234 (Andrew 
von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003) (“The nirvana story of restorative justice helps us to imagine what 
is possible, but it should not be used as the benchmark for what is practical and achievable. The 
nirvana story assumes that people are ready and able to resolve disputes, to repair harms, to feel 
contrite, and perhaps to forgive others when they may not be ready and able to do any of these 
things at all. It holds out the promise that these things should happen most of the time when 
research suggests that these things can occur some of the time.”; Braithwaite, Restorative 
Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 107, at 104–07 (listing 
objections but ending on decidedly optimistic note); Levrant et al., supra note 125, at 417 
(listing four “unanticipated consequences of restorative justice: (1) it will serve as a means of 
getting tough on offenders; (2) it will not be restorative for victims, offenders, or communities; 
(3) it will be more of a symbolic than a substantive reform; and (4) it will reinforce existing 
race and class biases besetting the criminal justice system”); Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of 
Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 1 UTAH L. REV. 375 (2003) (arguing 
that restorative justice advocates wish to replace criminal justice system as we know it and 
therefore are “anti-justice”). 
 129. For a recent discussion of these and other empirical issues, see, e.g., GORDON 
BAZEMORE AND MARA SCHIFF, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: 
BUILDING THEORY AND POLICY FROM PRACTICE (2005); MARGARITA ZERNOVA, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEALS AND REALITIES (2009); DECLAN ROCHE, ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2003); Jeff Latimer, Craig Dowden & Danielle Muise, The 
Effectiveness of Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta-Analysis, 85 PRISON J. 127 (2005); 
Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological 
Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167 (2003). 
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been such a disaster for these communities. And in an ideal world, 
restorative justice would also be appealing to people of color for 
positive reasons. I will argue that analyses of privilege and power can 
deepen the restorative justice project, producing an approach that 
some activists call “transformative justice.” 
Discussions of subordination were largely absent from the early 
theoretical, policy, and advocacy writings on restorative justice,
130
 
with one exception: the issue of violence against women. A 
thoughtful and passionate feminist literature has emerged on the 
question of whether restorative justice principles and practices have 
any application to domestic violence, hate crimes, and sexual 
offenses.
131
 Summarizing much of this debate, Kathleen Daly and 
Julia Stubbs identify four potential benefits of restorative justice as a 
response to gender violence: (1) victim voice and participation; (2) 
victim validation and offender responsibility; (3) a communicative 
 
 130. There are two likely reasons for this inattention to power and privilege. First, most of 
the best-known and influential restorative justice advocates have been white, and race issues 
may not have been on their radar, may have seemed outside their expertise, or may have 
thought to have been too divisive in the context of the mission to build a strong and unified 
movement. The exception is the frequent reference in canonical restorative justice texts to 
traditional indigenous practices of peacemaking and conflict resolution as models. As Kathleen 
Daly has noted, however, at least in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain these 
references to traditional practices have a whiff of romanticism about them, given the economic 
and political disenfranchisement of most Indian and First Nations peoples in these countries: 
 With the flexibility of informal justice, practitioners, advocates and members of 
minority groups may see the potential for introducing culturally sensible and 
responsive forms of justice. But to say that conferencing is an indigenous justice 
practice (or “has its roots in indigenous justice”) is to re-engage a white-centered view 
of the world. . . . A good deal of the advocacy literature is of this ilk: white-centered, 
creaming off and homogenizing of cultural difference and specificity. 
Daly, Restorative Justice: The Real Story, supra note 127. 
 A second possible reason for inattention to issues of subordination, particularly racial 
subordination, is that restorative justice theories tend to be rooted in the sociology and 
philosophy of communitarianism, which also has had very little to say about the fractures of 
“community” that forms of subordination like racism create. For a pithy critique of civic 
republicanism in this light, see Kathleen Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 
(1988). For a charge that restorative justice is based on sentimental utopianism, see ANNALISE 
ACORN, COMPULSORY COMPASSION: A CRITIQUE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2004). 
 131. Examples of this literature include RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN (James Ptacek ed., 2009); Barbara Hudson, Restorative Justice: The Challenge of 
Racial and Sexual Violence, 25 J.L. & SOC’Y 237 (1998); and Barbara Hudson, Restorative 
Justice and Gendered Violence: Diversion or Effective Justice?, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 616 
(2002).  
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and flexible environment; and (4) relationship repair (if the victim 
desires it).
132
 Barbara Hudson agrees that restorative justice promises 
a dialogue in which the voice of the victim is heard clearly and taken 
seriously, opening the door for true remorse by the offender.
133
 In a 
family conference or circle, the perpetrator of gender violence will 
not be able to ignore, avoid, or belittle criticism of his actions, and 
will be forced to give a justifying account not only to the victim, but 
to third parties. At the same time, restorative justice processes seem 
well positioned to engage the perpetrator of gender violence in a 
process that might bring him to genuine change by providing an 
environment that is supportive rather than traumatizing. 
However, feminists see potential dangers as well as benefits in a 
restorative justice approach to gender violence. First, Kathleen Daly 
and Julie Stubbs observe that male and female offenders may 
experience restorative justice processes differently.
134
 Empirical 
research on restorative justice practices conducted by Daly and others 
found that female offenders tended to be more defiant, less 
apologetic, and less compliant with the process generally, and that 
female victims may be more likely to feel re-victimized or disparaged 
by the restorative process than are male victims.
135
  
Second, and more importantly, feminists worry about the 
subordination effects of restorative justice when used as a response to 
sexual and domestic violence.
136
 Daly and Stubbs have identified and 
summarized these concerns as follows.  
A first concern is the victim’s physical and emotional safety: “[a]s 
an informal process, [restorative justice] may put victims at risk of 
continued violence; it may permit power imbalances to go unchecked 
and reinforce abusive behaviour.”137  
 
 132. Kathleen Daly & Julie Stubbs, Feminist Engagement with Restorative Justice, 10 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 9, 18 (2006). 
 133. Hudson observes that restorative justice theory echoes or draws upon Jurgen 
Habermas’s theory of “communicative morality,” which “is in the exposition of views, the 
listening to accounts of harm, the attempting to justify prejudice, that more progressive moral 
consensus can be reached.” Hudson, Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Racial and Sexual 
Violence, supra note 114, at 250. 
 134. Daly & Stubbs, supra note 132, at 15–16. 
 135. Id. at 16.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 17. 
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Second, offenders may be able to manipulate the process “to 
diminish guilt, trivialize the violence, or shift the blame to the 
victim.”138 The concern is that an informal process may be more 
subject to offender manipulation than is a formal process.
139
  
Third, and relatedly, feminists worry that in situations involving 
domestic violence and some sexual offenses, such as incest, the 
participants in the conference or circle who are designated supporters 
of the victim may actually have mixed loyalties, and may challenge 
or ignore the victim’s account of what happened, minimize the harm, 
or otherwise manipulate the process.
140
 
Fourth, feminists worry that the combination of the restorative 
process, which is geared toward building consensus, and the 
conventional gendered expectation that women should be placating, 
compliant, and “nice” may result in undue pressure on female victims 
of domestic or sexual violence to forgive the offender, accept an 
insincere apology, agree to preserve a relationship that feels unsafe, 
or accept a settlement arrangement that leaves the victim 
unsatisfied.
141
  
Fifth, feminists share the concern with other critics of restorative 
justice that the process will simply be ineffective and have no impact 
on the offender’s attitude, beliefs, or future behavior.142 
Finally, two related concerns go to the expressive function of 
restorative justice processes for sexual and domestic violence, above 
and beyond their impact on the victim and the offender. Precisely 
because its methods are less violent and brutal, and less conventional 
than traditional criminal justice processes, some feminists fear that 
restorative justice for domestic and sexual violence may “send a 
message” that this kind of violence is less important and less harmful 
than other kinds of violence.
143
 This possibility is heightened by the 
fact that politically, reformers are most likely to accept restorative 
justice processes for juvenile offenses and for crimes perceived as 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. A classic article expressing this reservation in the context of mediation is Trina Grillo, 
The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). 
 140. Daly & Stubbs, supra note 132, at 17. 
 141. Grillo, The Mediation Alternative, supra note 139, at 1576–77.  
 142. Daly & Stubbs, supra note 132, at 17. 
 143. Id. 
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“minor,” and least likely to accept restorative justice for crimes like 
murder.
144
 
This point connects to the concern that motivated feminists to ally 
with the criminal justice system in the first place: the sense that 
violence against women is not taken seriously in our 
heteropatriarchal society. In one study, for example, when 
interviewed about a potential restorative justice proposal, women 
who had experienced intimate violence expressed the concern that 
their “community”—a term much lauded in restorative justice 
literature—did not adequately support victims of violence against 
women.
145
 Not only may organizations in civil society lack the 
financial and person-power resources to provide counseling, training, 
safe havens, and monitoring of agreements reached through 
restorative justice processes, particularly considering the prevalence 
of domestic and sexual violence; but community norms may only 
weakly support victims, or at worst may reinforce male dominance.
146
  
Changing the frame from domestic and sexual violence to gender 
violence more broadly makes the concerns about community norms 
even more pressing. Consider, for instance, gender violence targeting 
individuals perceived as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or 
intersex (LBGTI). As the continuing and well-publicized debates on 
same-sex marriage and whether sexual minorities can or should 
renounce their sexual orientations and live as if straight indicate, 
LBGTI identity remains highly stigmatized in the general population. 
 
 144. See VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 124, at 186–90 (exploring the objection to 
restorative justice that it will not work with “dangerous” offenders). 
 145. Pamela Rubin, A Community of One’s Own? When Women Speak to Power About 
Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 89–91 (James 
Ptacek ed., 2010). 
 146. As Rubin puts it: 
Many women were extremely concerned about community attitudes, a lack of 
understanding of woman abuse and women’s criminalization, and a paucity of 
community competence to administer justice for women. In their view, this could take 
the form of simple ignorance and indifference to abuse; victim-blaming; partiality 
toward the abuser; stereotyping based on race, mental disability, sexual orientation, or 
other personal characteristics; and reflexive condemnation of women in conflict with 
the law. Many of the aspects of systemic discrimination women described as existing 
within the justice system were seen as writ large in the broader community. 
Id. at 89. 
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Queer men and women living in impoverished black and brown 
neighborhoods, moreover, must contend with being a double 
minority, marginalized in both gay-identified communities and black-
and brown-identified communities.
147
 It is hard to imagine that most 
families, friends, and neighborhoods already have the capacity to 
provide robust social, emotional, and material support for such 
victims of homophobic gender violence. 
Moreover, in some neighborhoods and communities displays of 
“destructive masculinity” may be condoned, even admired and 
respected.
148
 Restorative justice for gender violence must be assessed 
in the context of local, regional, and national cultures of hegemonic 
masculinity—heteropatriarchal subcultures that are changing, if at all, 
only very slowly and unevenly.  
Critical scholar-activists compound these worries about the 
effectiveness of restorative justice processes and an uncritical 
reliance on “the community” with a concern about the movement’s 
comfort with the state. For instance, Andrea Smith criticizes 
restorative justice proponents: 
[N]either [restorative justice] advocates nor critics seem to 
question the role of the criminal justice system in addressing 
violence. . . . 
 The assumption behind this insistence on working with the 
state is that the U.S. Government (or Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand) is essentially a benevolent or neutral democratic 
institution that can serve peoples’ interests, although they may 
be marred by instances of racism. Presumably, if we can 
simply eradicate the racism and the sexism of the state, it can 
then provide justice for survivors of violence.
149
 
In contrast, Smith argues that “the nation-state, particularly the 
United States, is not a bastion of freedom from which ideals are being 
 
 147. For explorations of the dilemmas facing queer black people, see, e.g., KEITH BOYKIN, 
ONE MORE RIVER TO CROSS: BLACK AND GAY IN AMERICA (1996); DANGEROUS LIAISONS: 
BLACKS, GAYS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Eric Brandt ed., 1999).  
 148. See SpearIt, supra note 8.  
 149. Andrea Smith, Beyond Restorative Justice, in Ptacek, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 86, at 264. 
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eroded through gender and racial violence—gender and racial 
violence represent the fulfillment of the ideals of U.S. democracy.”150 
If this is true, then “[s]imply adding [restorative justice] to the present 
criminal justice system is likely to further strengthen the criminal 
justice apparatus, particularly in communities of color that are 
deemed in need of restoration.”151 
Mindful of these critiques, some anti-subordinationist advocates 
have begun to speak not of restorative justice, but of “transformative 
justice.”152 In my understanding, transformative justice begins by 
embracing two of the basic tenets of restorative justice. First and 
foremost is the conviction that our current punishment-oriented 
criminal justice system does not do what it purports to do. It does not 
effectively rehabilitate, incapacitate, deter, or provide retribution 
against the offenders. Nor does it effectively make “noncriminals” 
safer, provide healing or closure for survivors of violence, or improve 
the neighborhoods and communities that are most victimized by 
street crime. Rather, as we have seen, the existing criminal justice 
system functions as a “race- and gender-making” machine, imposing 
political and economic disabilities on black and brown communities, 
perpetuating destructive masculinity, and perpetuating racial 
stereotypes in much the same way as the old system of Jim Crow.  
Second, transformative justice accepts the basic restorative justice 
tenet that “harm,” not “crime,” should be the key concept that 
triggers intervention. As we have seen, replacement of crime with 
harm has a number of important theoretical implications: it 
undermines the state’s monopoly on identifying and naming injury; it 
draws our attention to the micro level of psychology and the macro 
level of political and economic structures; and it focuses us on the 
dignity of victims and offenders alike. 
Transformative justice, however, differs from restorative justice in 
two ways. First, transformative justice advocates place anti-
subordination at the center of their work.
153
 Both the values and the 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 266. 
 152. Id. 
 153. For example, Andrea Smith argues that “sexual/domestic violence within communities 
of color cannot be addressed seriously without dealing with the larger structures of violence, 
such as militarism, attacks on immigrants and Indian treaty rights, police brutality, the 
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process dimensions of restorative justice must be developed and 
implemented with an eye to the relations of privilege and power that 
pervade our society. Moreover, in accordance with the insights of 
critical race feminism, one-dimensional analyses of these relations—
like the treatment of violence against women and violence against 
sexual minorities as distinct though parallel—are insufficient.154 The 
aim of transformative justice is to recognize and grapple with the 
complicated ways in which race, gender, and other modes of 
domination are mutually entwined. The centrality of transformation 
means that each incident of personal violence should be understood 
in a larger context of structural violence.
155
  
Second, the transformative justice approach keeps front and center 
the insight that in order to fully realize this aspiration, scholars and 
advocates cannot rely uncritically on either state institutions and 
practices or the traditional practices and institutions of civil society, 
including the family and “the community.”156 Restorative justice 
advocates tend to embrace representatives of the state, the family, and 
the community as stakeholders along with offenders and victims in 
the process of identifying harm and making things right.
157
 
 
proliferation of prisons, economic neo-colonialism, and institutional racism.” Andrea Smith, 
Colors of Violence, COLORLINES 14–15 (Dec. 15, 2000), quoted in Ptacek, supra note 86, at 17. 
 154. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) (introducing concept of intersectionality); Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, New Complexity Theories: From Theoretical Innovation to Doctrinal Reform, 71 
UMKC L. REV. 431 (2002) (reviewing theoretical work that builds on concept of 
intersectionality). 
 155. For a powerful description of structural violence, see Paul Farmer, On Suffering and 
Structural Violence: A View from Below, 125 DAEDALUS 261, 281 (1996). 
 156. Andrea Smith, for example, argues: 
[M]any organizations address violence directed at communities of color—police 
brutality, racism, economic exploitation, colonialism. Many other organizations 
address violence against women within communities. But very few organizations 
address violence on both fronts simultaneously. . . . The challenge women of color 
face is to combat both personal and state violence. 
Smith, supra note 131. 
 157. For example, the “Wagga model” of family group conferencing trains police and 
probation officers, among others, to conduct conferences. See PAUL MCCOLD AND BENJAMIN 
WACHTEL, RESTORATIVE POLICING EXPERIMENT: THE BETHLEHEM PENNSYLVANIA POLICE 
FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING PROJECT (May 1998), available at http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/ 
BPD.pdf. 
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Transformative justice, however, recognizes that all these 
stakeholders are embedded in unjust relations of power, including 
pervasive racism, economic exploitation, xenophobia, and 
heteropatriarchy.
158
  
What is the goal of transformative justice? Andrea Smith suggests 
that if “survivors” of violence rather than “clients” of social service 
agencies were their organizational base, anti-violence movements 
would seek to “(1) challenge state violence and (2) build 
communities that would actually provide safety for survivors by 
challenging the sexism, homophobia, and other forms of oppression 
that exist within them.”159 Barbara Hudson describes what feminist 
and anti-racist advocates might want from an ideal response to racial 
hate crimes and crimes against women:  
[S]trategies that can deal with large numbers of victims and 
offenders; that can provide protection and redress for victims; 
that can change social attitudes from tolerance to disapproval; 
that can inculcate remorse and a desire for change in 
perpetrators, and that can bring about a rebalancing of power 
within the crime relationship.
160
 
Smith’s and Hudson’s visions point to security as a central goal of 
transformative justice. Conventional criminal justice looks to 
punishment to establish security: if would-be offenders are 
effectively deterred and actual offenders are incapacitated through 
punishment, victims and potential victims will be safe. The 
restorative justice movement and its concern with redress for victims 
bring the question of security into sharper focus. As its critics point 
out, however, restorative justice advocates are too sanguine about the 
ability of existing support systems, in families and in civil society, to 
provide real security for victims of gender violence. By questioning 
both existing state institutions such as the criminal justice system and 
existing civil society institutions like the family, transformative 
justice advocates reopen the question, What does safety look like?  
 
 158. See Smith, supra note 131. 
 159. Smith, supra note 131, at 266. 
 160. Hudson, Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Racial and Sexual Violence, supra note 
133. 
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As yet, there are only tentative answers. Some restorative justice 
advocates speak of peacemaking rather than order as the goal of a 
good society: 
[Peace] requires a community’s commitment to respect the 
rights of its members and to help resolve conflicts among 
them. It requires that those members respect community 
interests even when they conflict with their individual 
interests. It is this context that communities and their members 
assume responsibility for addressing the underlying social, 
economic and moral factors that contribute to conflict within 
the community. “Order,” on the other hand, is imposed on the 
community. It sets external limits on behavior and enforces 
those limits to minimize overt conflict and to control 
potentially chaotic factors. . . . 
 Both order and peace are appropriate means to achieving 
safety. However, as imposed order increases, personal freedom 
decreases; hence, peace will be sought in a society that values 
freedom. Security built primarily on governmentally imposed 
order is detrimental to a free society, as conditions in police 
states throughout the world demonstrate. On the other hand, 
when the community fails to foster peace, it may be necessary 
for the government to intervene and impose order.
161
 
One precondition of peace is economic security. Some prison 
abolitionists imagine communities supported by a robust welfare state 
as the foundation of security. Critical Resistance, for example, 
describes its positive vision as “the creation of genuinely safe, 
healthy communities that do not rely on prisons and policing to 
respond to harm.”162 For Critical Resistance, the “end goal of 
abolition is to reduce harm in our communities by creating lasting 
alternatives to punishment and prisons, investing in the things that 
 
 161. VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 124, at 35–36. 
 162. Our Vision, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://www.criticalresistance.org/article.php?id= 
51 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011); see also GENERATIONFIVE, TOWARD TRANSFORMATIVE 
JUSTICE 9–12 (June 2007), available at http://www.generationfive.org/downloads/G5_Toward_ 
Transformative_Justice.pdf (explaining why the state should not be a part of a liberatory 
strategy to end child sexual abuse). 
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truly build safe communities such as education, housing, and 
employment, thus eliminating the ‘need’ for the prison industrial 
complex.”163 In addition to adequate education, housing, and 
employment, environmental justice advocates and public health 
experts might add that the most disenfranchised neighborhoods need 
physical and social infrastructures conducive to health, including 
reduced exposure to toxins, clean and safe buildings in which to live 
and work, and accessible health care for both mental and physical 
illness. 
Another precondition of meaningful security might be political 
empowerment. Restorative justice’s circle processes are consonant 
with community organizing practices that seek political 
empowerment and leadership capacity-building. As some advocates 
have noted, the restorative turn also opens the door to a more 
ambitious, and badly needed project: racial reconciliation. The most 
disenfranchised minority communities do not only need less 
incarceration and more jobs and schooling; they need to claim their 
political and social citizenship.
164
 Equal citizenship and a kind of 
communitarian civic republicanism is often the implied framework of 
restorative justice. But the project of making that sense of national 
community real is a transformative one. Philosopher Margaret Urban 
Walker, for example, argues that restorative justice provides a 
promising framework for a discussion of reparations for American 
slavery.
165
 This is so, she argues, because restorative justice, properly 
understood, is transformative: it is not focused on “restoring” a status 
quo, but rather on building relationships in the direction of “moral 
adequacy.”166  
 
 163. CRITICAL RESISTANCE, supra note 162. 
 164. See I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the 
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 165. Margaret Urban Walker, Restorative Justice and Reparations, 37 J. SOC. PHIL. 377 
(2006). 
 166. As Walker puts it: 
I propose that we understand “restoration” in all contexts as normative: “restoration” 
refers to repairs that move relationships in the direction of becoming morally adequate, 
without assuming a morally adequate status quo ante. Morally adequate relations are 
ones in which three conditions obtain. In them, people are confident that they share 
some basic standards for the treatment of each other. People are able to trust each 
other to abide by those standards or at least to acknowledge fault if they (or others) do 
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As Gilligan and others have argued, structural factors, though 
important, are not the sole cause of violence. Some transformative 
justice advocates are exploring psychic and interpersonal foundations 
of meaningful security. In accordance with its mission to end child 
sexual abuse, GenerationFIVE emphasizes the importance of 
understanding and addressing trauma and its effects on the body and 
mind.
167
 Its leaders argue that understanding trauma is important on 
at least two levels. First, it is necessary in order to support the victims 
of child sexual abuse and to assist in the recovery process.
168
 Second, 
the experience of trauma affects organizing and community building 
and constrains the scope and pace of social change.
169
 In 
GenerationFIVE’s view, moreover, trauma can be not only individual 
but collective, caused by experiences such as “genocide, 
displacement, poverty, incarceration, mass sexual violence, or natural 
disasters.”170 This perspective suggests that communities ravaged by 
the cycle of destructive masculinity may need not only material 
 
not abide by them. And so, finally, people are entitled to be hopeful that unacceptable 
treatment will not prevail, that unacceptable behavior will not be defended or ignored 
where it occurs, and that victims will not be abandoned in their reliance on our shared 
commitment to our standards and to each other. 
Id. at 384. 
 167. The organization defines “trauma” as: 
[H]armful experiences that persist long after an immediate threat or abusive experience 
is over. The impact of trauma can live on in the individual, group or culture for years 
and even generations. For individuals, trauma is an experience that affects body, mind, 
emotions, spirit, and our relationships. The impact can establish patterns of reactions 
based on traumatic experiences from the past, irrespective of whether the present 
actually reflects the same dangers or not. 
 These typical reactions such as denial, paralysis, hopelessness, blame, rage, and 
shame play out in our interpersonal and organizational relationships. They are also 
present in the responses we may get from the communities and networks in which we 
live, organize, and work. The better we can identify these responses, the more effective 
we can be at moving individuals and collectives from less useful traumatic responses 
toward those that can support personal and political liberation. 
GENERATIONFIVE, supra note 162, at 23. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. (“People’s relationships to violence and trauma, whether those relationships 
are historic or current, individual or collective, help determine what we think is possible, what 
impact we think we can have in the world, and how much we trust other people.”). 
 170. Id. 
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assistance and political empowerment but individual and collective 
healing before they can be declared transformed. 
These efforts to rethink what we mean by security from a 
transformative justice perspective bring us back to heteropatriarchy. 
The feminist and queer campaigns to reconfigure the family and civil 
society, if extended further, might allow us, finally, to transform 
police and prisons. For example, as we have seen, destructive 
masculinity is an insidious presence in policing. But the police 
mission “to serve and protect” need not be accomplished through 
force and domination. Scattered attempts to reshape policing along 
the lines of social work, for instance, deserve more attention and 
study.
171
 Similarly, jails and prisons could be modeled along the lines 
of secure facilities for the treatment of mental illness and substance 
abuse, with the main mission of providing sanctuary, protection, and 
support for people who are momentarily out of control. Prisons need 
not be enormous, centralized, total institutions; as in the original 
vision of mental illness “deinstitutionalization”; they might be small, 
local, and scattered throughout a community.
172
 Though even in a 
 
 171. Such an experiment was undertaken by the New Haven Police Academy in the late 
1980s under the direction of Kay Codish and chief of police Nicholas Pastore. Using the slogan 
“Police others as you have them police you,” Codish sought a diverse police force, reaching out 
explicitly to racial and sexual minorities who traditionally have not been welcome on police 
forces. She also emphasized nonviolent management techniques and a broad multicultural 
education for police recruits, much to the dismay of many who wanted a more “traditional” 
(read force-oriented and masculinity-driven) training regime. See Nicholas Pastore, Police 
Others as You Would Have Them Police You, 1 RECONSIDER Q. 10 (2000–2001), available at 
http://www.reconsider.org/quarterly/2000_2001_Winter/PoliceQuarterly.pdf. 
 172. See, e.g., Matt Boucher, Turning a Blind (White) Eye in Legislating Mental Health 
Parity: The Unmet, Overlooked Needs of the Working Poor in Racial and Ethnic Minority 
Communities, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 465, 490–92 (2003) (discussing benefits of 
community-based treatment centers). For an exploration of several federal constitutional 
sources of the right to community-based treatment for people with mental disabilities, see Bruce 
A. Arrigo, The Logic of Identity and the Politics of Justice: Establishing a Right to Community-
Based Treatment for the Institutionalized Mentally Disabled, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 1 (1992). For a general review of the federal constitutional, federal statutory, 
and state statutory bases for the right to community-based treatment and a search for that right 
in state constitutions, see Anthony B. Klapper, Comment, Finding a Right in State 
Constitutions for Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 739 (1993); see 
also Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Comment, Community Mental Health Treatment for the Mentally 
Ill—When Does Less Restrictive Treatment Become a Right?, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1971 (1992) 
(history and analysis of federal constitutional and statutory bases of right to community-based 
treatment). Of course, in order for these facilities to be useful, they must be financially 
accessible for people without means. See Shane Levesque, Closing the Door: Mental Illness, 
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perfect world there might be people who are incapable of living in the 
general population without harming others, this group might be much 
smaller than we think if the determinants of violence we have named 
have been effectively addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The struggle against gender violence brings us back, again, to the 
fact that heteropatriarchy kills. The dilemma of anti-violence 
advocates—that relying on criminal justice to punish the perpetrators 
of violence against women and sexual minorities in the long run 
perpetuates more gender violence, directed particularly at the most 
vulnerable and disenfranchised communities—leads in the end to an 
even more daunting predicament: a struggle against an ideology so 
deeply rooted in Western society and culture that it seems 
ineradicable. 
Yet feminist and queer movements have already begun the 
process of transformation, and in a relatively short time. A gender 
violence analysis brings us more good news: the fight against 
heteropatriarchy does not make straight men the enemy. The 
organizations that have planted themselves at the convergence of the 
struggles against private and state-sponsored gender violence—
INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence, Justice Now, Critical 
Resistance, Sista II Sista, GenerationFIVE, Project Nia, RJOY, 
Friends Are Reaching Out (FAR Out), the Young Women’s 
Empowerment Project, Communities Against Rape and Abuse, and 
many others—have goals that can only be considered utopian. Yet 
their effort to build a social, political, and economic order that would 
eliminate gender violence and foster genuine security should inspire.  
Moreover, the broad vision and ambitious goals of these groups 
need not put them at odds with more reformist projects. In practice, 
the restorative justice movement has focused on modifying the 
existing criminal justice system, but its practices and values point to a 
 
the Criminal Justice System, and the Need for a Uniform Mental Health Policy, 34 NOVA L. 
REV. 711, 738 (2010) (emphasizing the need for “timely access to Medicaid and other public 
benefits for mentally ill offenders”); Lucille D. Wood, Costs and the Right to Community-
Based Treatment, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 501 (1998). 
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much more revolutionary project. Guided by a race-aware feminist 
analysis, restorative justice theories and practices can serve as a 
testing ground for exploring what real security looks like and how to 
get there without brutalizing black and brown communities. 
Restorative justice advocates and gender violence advocates have a 
common interest in identifying and addressing violence committed 
under the auspices of the family, the state, and the community. 
Transformative justice has the potential to link these advocates and 
critical scholars in alliances that can work on different scales, but 
with the same horizon of liberation.   
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